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I. INTRODUCTION 
The phrase “consumer protection case” may conjure up a 
used-car buyer trying to get recompense for a vehicle that turned 
out to be less than promised, or an elderly homeowner victimized 
by predatory lending tactics trying to maintain possession of her 
home.  In August 2000, the private right of action to enforce 
Minnesota consumer protection laws was held to be something 
2
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entirely different.  After the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision 
in Ly v. Nystrom,1 a business complaining about a competitor’s 
advertising is more likely to have available a private right of action 
to enforce these laws than either the frustrated car buyer or the 
predatory lending victim. 
I have been asked to evaluate whether private enforcement of 
consumer protection laws in Minnesota is “progressive.”  The 
answer is that Minnesota courts have essentially shut the 
courthouse door on individual consumers seeking redress in 
private actions under statutory fraud laws following the judicial 
creation in Ly of a “public benefit” limitation on bringing such 
lawsuits, and this outcome is not progressive consumer protection 
enforcement.  Minnesota courts generally permit statutory fraud 
suits only in class action cases, for large groups of plaintiffs, and 
even for some business plaintiffs. 
Part II of this article identifies the meaning of the terms 
“consumer protection law” and “progressive,” as used in this 
article.2  Part III explains the creation of the “public benefit” limit 
on suits under Minnesota statutory fraud laws as enunciated in Ly.3  
Part IV examines the application of this new limiting principle, 
concluding that it has all but foreclosed individual consumers from 
private enforcement of statutory fraud laws.4  Part V analyzes how 
the public benefit limit overturned prior case law.5  Part VI 
discusses the interpretative gaps in the judicial decision creating 
the public benefit limit that make it difficult to determine if this 
sweeping restriction was the intended result, and that may make 
the doctrine difficult to sustain.6  Finally, Part VII concludes that 
this restriction of the individual private right of action has impaired 
progressive enforcement of consumer protection laws and should 
be abandoned, or at least substantially narrowed.7 
 
 1. 615 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 2000).  The author filed an amicus curiae brief in 
this case on behalf of Attorney General Mike Hatch. 
 2. See infra Part II. 
 3. See infra Part III. 
 4. See infra Part IV. 
 5. See infra Part V. 
 6. See infra Part VI. 
 7. See infra Part VII. 
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II. PROGRESSIVE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF STATE CONSUMER 
PROTECTION LAWS 
Consumer protection laws are a statutory response to the 
inadequacy of the common law in protecting buyers from unfair 
and deceptive acts in the marketplace.  These laws attempt to 
regulate a vast array of marketplace conduct using a variety of 
legislative strategies.  The first subsection below describes the types 
of consumer protection laws at both the state and federal level, 
distinguishing general statutory fraud laws from topical consumer 
protection laws.  The following subsection defines “progressive” for 
purposes of this article. 
A. The Expansive Universe of State Consumer Protection Law 
State consumer protection law can be placed in two broad 
categories: (1) general statutory fraud laws; and (2) topical laws 
that regulate specific types of consumer transactions. 
1. General Statutory Fraud Laws 
The primary federal statute broadly protecting consumers 
from fraud in the marketplace is section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (“FTC Act”), which declares unlawful “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”8  In the 1960s 
and 1970s, every state in the country adopted a similar general 
statutory fraud law prohibiting unfair and deceptive marketplace 
conduct.  There are four archetypes of such laws: (1) consumer-
fraud acts; (2) the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act 
(“UDTPA”); (3) “little FTC” acts, which are substantially similar to 
section 5 of the FTC Act; and (4) the Uniform Consumer Sales 
Practices Act.9  These state statutory fraud laws are often called state 
 
 8. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000). 
 9. JONATHON SHELDON & CAROLYN CARTER, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND 
PRACTICES § 3.4.2 (6th ed. 2004).  Although commentators use different 
organizing schemes for state “unfair and deceptive acts and practices” (UDAP) 
laws, these four categories generally cover the most commonly used groupings of 
these laws.  See J.R. Franke & D.A. Ballam, New Applications of Consumer Protection 
Law: Judicial Activism or Legislative Directive?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 347, 366–67 
(1992).  See also Albert N. Shelden, State Consumer Protection and Unfair Competition, 
SF74 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 501 (2001); Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade 
Practices Acts: Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437,  446–48 
(1991); Anthony Paul Dunbar, Comment, Consumer Protection: The Practical 
Effectiveness of State Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 59 TUL. L. REV. 427, 427–30, 
4
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“UDAP” laws, after the FTC phrase prohibiting “unfair and 
deceptive acts and practices.”10 
The FTC is charged with public enforcement of section 5 of 
the FTC Act, and state attorneys general are typically the public 
enforcers of state statutory fraud laws.11  A critical difference 
between the FTC Act and state statutory fraud laws is that section 5 
of the FTC Act has no private right of action.  All states except Iowa 
have a private right of action for violation of statutory fraud laws.12  
In most states, the private right of action includes the right to 
recover attorney’s fees for successful plaintiffs, the right to 
multiplied or enhanced damages, or both.13 
Minnesota has enacted two of these forms of statutory fraud 
laws: the Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”) and the UDTPA.  The 
Minnesota CFA prohibits the “act, use, or employment by any 
person of any fraud, false pretense, false promise, 
misrepresentation, misleading statement or deceptive practice.”14  
The UDTPA lists twelve acts that are prohibited when made by a 
person “in the course of business, vocation, or occupation,” and 
generally prohibits conduct that “similarly creates a likelihood of 
confusion or of misunderstanding.”15  Minnesota is one of only five 
states with both a consumer fraud act and an UDTPA version of a 
statutory fraud law.16 
In addition, Minnesota has another, older statutory fraud law 
entitled the False Statement in Advertising Act (“FSAA”).17  The 
FSAA prohibits an advertisement “which contains any material 
assertion, representation, or statement of fact which is untrue, 
deceptive, or misleading.” 18  This FSAA is a form of a model law 
 
465–72. (1984). 
 10. SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 9, § 1.1. 
 11. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, CONSUMER PROTECTION HANDBOOK 77–78 
(2004) [hereinafter “ABA”]. 
 12. SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 9, § 8.2. 
 13. ABA, supra note 11, at 85–86. 
 14. MINN. STAT. § 325F.69, subdiv. 1 (2004). 
 15. MINN. STAT. § 325D.44, subdiv. 1 (2004). 
 16. Delaware and Illinois, like Minnesota, have adopted separate CFA and 
UDTPA statutes.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2513 (CFA), 2532 (UDPTA) (2005); 
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 505/2 (CFA), 510/2 (UDTPA) (West 2001).  Alaska 
and West Virginia have incorporated the CFA into a UDTPA-type statute.  See, e.g., 
ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471 (2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-104 (West 2001). 
 17. MINN. STAT. § 325F.67 (2004).  The FSAA was initially adopted in 1913, 
MINN. STAT. § 8903 (supp. 1913). 
 18. Id. 
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known as a “Printer’s Ink” statute, which was named for an 
advertising industry trade journal that published the model law and 
urged its adoption at the turn of the twentieth century.19 
2. Topical Consumer Protection Laws 
Minnesota, like most other states, has a broad array of topical 
consumer protection laws targeting specific types of transactions.20  
Automobile buyers, for instance, have protections in Minnesota law 
related to previously salvaged cars, accuracy of odometer readings, 
or when they purchase a “lemon,” buy a service contract, obtain 
repairs, or finance their purchase of a motor vehicle, among other 
matters.21  Vacation travelers who buy timeshares, travel-club 
memberships or camping memberships all receive state law 
protections in statutes meant to regulate these particular 
purchases.22  State topical consumer protection laws also govern 
merchants who use specific types of sales practices.  For example, 
businesses are constrained in their actions when contacting 
consumers through automatic-dialing machines, unsolicited 
facsimile transmissions or emails, when sending and billing for 
unsolicited goods, or during door-to-door sales.23 
There are dozens of other topical consumer protection laws in 
Minnesota meant to provide protections for specific types of 
marketplace transactions or sales tactics.  From 2002 through 2005, 
Minnesota enacted new topical consumer protections relating to: 
homeowners in foreclosure, cell phone users entering long-term 
contracts, the use of private data by internet service providers, the 
sale of high-cost membership travel clubs, and a state do-not-call list 
for telemarketers.24 
 
 19. 3 GEORGE ERIC ROSDEN & PETER ERIC ROSDEN, THE LAW OF ADVERTISING § 
40.02 (2004). 
 20. See generally SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 9, § 5 (detailing various types 
of topical consumer protection laws). 
 21. MINN. STAT. §§ 65B.29 (Motor Vehicle Service Contracts), 168.66 (Service 
Contracts), 168A.151 (Salvage Titles), 325E.14 (Odometers Prohibited Acts), 
325F.59 (Repairs), 325F.665 (Purchase of New Motor Vehicles/Lemon Law) 
(2004). 
 22. Id. §§ 82A.01–.26 (Membership Camping Practices), 83.20–.45 
(Subdivided Lands), 325G.50–.505 (Membership Travel Contracts). 
 23. Id. §§ 325E.26 (Automatic Dialing-Announcing Devices), 325E.395 
(Facsimile Transmission of Unsolicited Advertising Materials), 325F.694 (Emails), 
325G.01 (Effect of Delivery), 325G.06–.11 (Home Solicitation Sales). 
 24. Id. §§ 325M.01–.09 (Internet Privacy), 325N.01–.09 (Mortgage 
Foreclosures), 325E.311–.316 (Telephone Solicitation), 325F.695 (Consumer 
6
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The extension and collection of credit is an area of particular 
attention for topical consumer protection laws.  The U.S. Congress 
has enacted statutory schemes regulating credit access and 
reporting, disclosure of credit terms and use of credit cards, debt 
collection, real estate and mortgage transactions, leasing, and 
electronic funds transactions.25  Unlike section 5 of the FTC Act, 
the federal statutory fraud law, these consumer credit statutes each 
contain an express private right of action.26  Minnesota regulates 
credit against this background of extensive federal regulation. For 
example, Minnesota has supplemented federal mortgage 
regulation with statutes allowing homeowners to cancel private 
mortgage insurance based on appreciation of home value, 
requiring written and enforceable interest-rate lock agreements, 
and limiting fees and excessive prepayment penalties.27 
3. Enforcement of Minnesota Consumer Protection Laws 
The attorney general is responsible for public enforcement of 
Minnesota’s statutory fraud laws.28  The attorney general is 
authorized in Minnesota Statutes section 8.31 to seek injunctive 
relief and civil penalties of up to $25,000 per violation of these 
laws.29  Minnesota courts have held that the attorney general can 
seek restitution to consumers for a violation of these laws, and 
section 8.31 has been amended to reflect this power of the attorney 
general.30  In addition, the CFA contains its own statutory injunctive 
 
Protection for Wireless Customers), 325G.505 (Membership Travel Contracts in 
Excess of $500). 
 25. See generally Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 
2601–2617 (2000) (implemented in HUD Regulation X, 24 C.F.R. pt. 3500); 
Homeowners Protection Act of 1998 (HOPA), 12 U.S.C. § 4901 (2000) 
(implemented in Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.31–.34); Truth-in-Lending Act 
(TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1666j (2000) (implemented in Federal Reserve 
Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226); Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1681–1681u (2000); Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–
1691f (2000) (implemented in Federal Reserve Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. pt. 202); 
Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692o (2000); and 
Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r (2000) 
(implemented in Federal Reserve Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. pt. 205). 
 26. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 2614 (2000); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1640, 1681n–1681p, 1693m 
(2000). 
 27. MINN. STAT. §§ 47.206–.207, 58.137 (2004). 
 28. Id. § 8.01, .31–.32. 
 29. Id. § 8.31, subdiv. 3. 
 30. State by Humphrey v. Alpine Air Products, Inc., 490 N.W.2d 888, 896 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992), aff’d, 500 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 1993); Act of June 2, 1987, 
7
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authority for the attorney general, and the FSAA provides that a 
violation is a misdemeanor that can be prosecuted by county 
attorneys.31 
Section 8.31 also contains Minnesota’s private right of action 
for its general statutory fraud laws.  Subdivision 3a of section 8.31 is 
known as “the private attorney general statute.”  The private 
attorney general statute provides an express right for “any person 
injured by a violation [of the laws enumerated in section 8.31 to] 
bring a civil action and recover damages, together with costs and 
disbursements, including costs of investigation and reasonable 
attorney’s fees.”32 
The CFA and FSAA are included in the list of laws 
“enumerated” in subdivision 1 of section 8.31.33  The UDTPA is not 
expressly included in subdivision 1 of section 8.31, but that 
subdivision provides a broad grant of authority to the attorney 
general to enforce laws “respecting unfair, discriminatory, and 
other unlawful practices in business, commerce, or trade, and 
specifically, but not exclusively”34 the laws listed thereafter.  Several 
Minnesota courts, both state and federal, have held that because 
the UDTPA is not expressly listed, it is not within the purview of the 
private attorney general statute and there is no private right of 
action for damages.35  The UDTPA contains its own authority for a 
private right of action, but that authority is limited to injunctive 
relief.36 
 
ch. 366, §§ 2, 4, 1987 Minn. Laws 2538, 2538–39 (codified as amended at MINN. 
STAT. § 8.31, subdivs. 2c, 3c (2004)). 
 31. MINN. STAT. §§ 325F.67, 325F.70, subdiv. 1 (2004). 
 32. Id. § 8.31, subdiv. 3a. 
 33. Id. § 8.31, subdiv. 1. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., No. Civ. 991550, 2001 WL 821831 
(D. Minn. Jul. 5, 2001); Alsides v. Brown Inst., Ltd., 592 N.W.2d 468, 476 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1999) (collecting cases).  Although a critique of these cases is beyond the 
scope of this article, it is noteworthy that none of theses cases have analyzed the 
question in depth.  In particular, none of these cases have considered the 
interpretive relevance of other statutes that have incorporated the UDTPA or 
“deceptive trade practices” phrase together with the other two general statutory 
fraud laws, including Minnesota Statutes sections 58.08, 325F.71, 325G.505, 
327B.05 (subdivision 1(d)), and 609.2336.  Nor have these cases addressed the fact 
that the UDTPA was passed in the same legislative session as the private attorney 
general statute, meaning that the UDTPA was not in existence at the time the 
private attorney general statute was introduced as legislation.  See 1973 Minn. Laws 
296 (private attorney general statute); 1973 Minn. Laws 420 (UDTPA). 
 36. MINN. STAT. § 325D.45, subdiv. 1 (2004). 
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Topical consumer protection laws have varying private 
enforcement mechanisms.  A few of these statutes contain no 
private right of action.  A substantial number of topical statutes 
with an express private right of action incorporate, directly or 
indirectly, the private attorney general statute as the enforcement 
provision.  Some statutes expressly reference section 8.31.37  Other 
such statutes state that a violation constitutes a per se violation of the 
CFA, or otherwise reference the CFA for enforcement, thereby 
indirectly allowing suit under the private attorney general statute.38  
A few statutes incorporate both section 8.31 and the CFA in some 
manner.39  Several statutes have both an independent private right 
of action and reference the private attorney general statute.40 
The language incorporating the private attorney general 
statute in these topical consumer laws varies tremendously.  For 
example: 
• A person suffering injury because of a violation of the 
law regulating prize solicitations has a private right of 
action in the law, but a violation of that law “also [is] a 
violation of sections 325F.68 to 325F.71 and is subject 
to section 8.31.”41 
 
• The “immigration services” statute provides consumer 
protections for immigrants who pay for services related 
to gaining U.S. citizenship or related matters: “The 
penalties and remedies of section 8.31 apply to 
violations of this section, including a private cause of 
action.”42 
 
• A violation of the law regulating industrial hygiene and 
safety professionals “is an unlawful practice under 
 
 37. See, e.g., Id. §§ 325E.31 (automatic dialing/announcing devices), 
325F.245, subdiv. 7 (landscape application contracts), 325G.10 (home solicitation 
sales), 325G.14 (personal solicitation of sales). 
 38. See, e.g., Id. §§ 148.5198, subdiv. 5 (hearing aid sales contracts), 184.33, 
subdiv. 2 (employment agent licenses), 327C.07, subdiv. 6 (manufactured home 
park contracts). 
 39. See, e.g., Id. §§ 325F.97, subdivs. 1–2 (rental purchase agreements), 332.59 
(credit services organizations). 
 40. See, e.g., Id. §§ 325E.33, subdivs. 3–4 (misconduct of athletic agents), 
325F.63, subdiv. 3 (service repairs), 325F.6643 (auto title branding). 
 41. Id. § 325F.755, subdiv. 7(b). 
 42. Id. § 325E.031, subdiv. 6. 
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section 325F.69.  A person who violates section 182A.04 
is subject to the remedies provided in sections 325F.68 
to 325F.70.”43 
 
• A violation of the law regulating agriculture contracts 
“is a violation subject to section 8.31, subdivision 1, 
[but] the remedies in section 8.31, subdivisions 3 and 
3a, are limited by section 17.9441.”44 
B. Progressive Enforcement of State Consumer Protection Laws 
For purposes of this article, “progressive” consumer protection 
enforcement means lawsuits that have the effect of rectifying an 
imbalance of power between consumers and the sellers who 
typically control the terms of marketplace transactions.  Minnesota 
courts have repeatedly stated that an underlying purpose of 
Minnesota UDAP law is to address the problem of lesser bargaining 
power by consumers.  The Minnesota Supreme Court recently 
reaffirmed that “one of the central purposes of the Consumer 
Fraud Act is to address the unequal bargaining power that is often 
found in consumer transactions.”45 
Consumer protection laws are the progeny of “progressive” 
traditions in American politics.  The original consumer protection 
laws were the result of reform notions rooted in the Progressive 
movement of the early twentieth century.  One fundamental 
concern reflected in Progressive-era legislation was the use of 
government power to remedy the unequal bargaining power of the 
individual.  Antitrust law, union protections, food safety, and other 
such regulations were enacted in part to offset control by 
increasingly large and powerful corporations of the labor and 
consumer marketplace.46  The first nonprofit consumer advocacy 
 
 43. Id. § 182A.05. 
 44. Id. § 17.944, subdivs. 7–8. 
 45. Wiegand v. Walser Auto. Groups, Inc., 683 N.W.2d 807, 812 (Minn. 2004).  
See also Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1002 (D. 
Minn. 2003); Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 308 (Minn. 2000); First Nat’l Bank of 
North v. Miller Schroeder Fin., Inc., 709 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006); 
D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); Love v. Amsler, 441 
N.W.2d 555, 559 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
 46. JOHN F. WALKER & HAROLD G. VATTER, THE RISE OF BIG GOVERNMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 19–20 (1997); Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court--
Part II: Race and the “Crack Down" on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 333 (1999).  
See generally MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND 
10
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organizations, such as the National Consumer’s League, came into 
existence at this time.47 
The progressive era offered inspiration, but the enactment of 
modern consumer protection laws started with the New Deal and 
came to fruition in a flurry of activity in the 1960s and 1970s.48  The 
grandfather of statutory fraud laws, the “unfair and deceptive acts 
and practices” language in section 5 of the FTC Act, was inserted 
into the FTC Act in 1938.49  In the 1960s and 1970s, both federal 
and state governments enacted a range of consumer protection 
laws, including the widespread adoption of state statutory fraud 
laws, consumer credit protections, and topical consumer laws.  Like 
progressive-era reform activities, consumer protection laws were 
enacted in part to remedy the unequal bargaining power of 
individual consumers in a marketplace dominated by large 
corporations.50 
For the courts of the first half of the twentieth century, 
progressive legal thinkers measured success, in part, by overturning 
the prevailing judicial philosophy of formalistic notions of 
“freedom of contract” that stood in the way of government 
regulation to correct market power imbalances.  The Lochner-era 
Court found due process constitutional protection for freedom of 
contract as justification for overturning Progressive legislation. 51  
 
ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900–1933 (1990).  Keller also describes the rise of 
consumerism and consumer debt, especially related to automobile purchase, as 
part of the economic change occurring in the era.  Id. at 13–14.  Many scholars 
note the enactment of these regulatory schemes but argue that the Progressive era 
was a conservative movement controlled by the business interests ostensibly being 
regulated.  See, e.g., GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A 
REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900–1916, at 2 (1963). 
 47. Patricia M. Kuntze, Communicating With The FDA: The Office Of Consumer 
Affairs, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 15, 16 (1993). 
 48. Franke & Ballam, supra note 9, at 355.  See also Kuntze, supra note 47, at 16 
(describing the consumer movement to protect from unsafe products as occurring 
in three phases: “the Progressive Era, when consumers were seen as gullible; the 
New Deal, when consumers were viewed as targets of the dangers of available 
foods and drugs; and the 1960s and 1970s, when consumers became tied to larger 
citizen movements”). 
 49. Wheeler-Lea Act, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 45 (2000)). 
 50. Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 
1189, 1283–84 (1986).  See also DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW § 
3.2 (2005) (describing one of the reasons for the enactment of state statutory 
fraud laws as “a perceived inequality of bargaining power between merchants and 
consumers”). 
 51. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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Progressive legal thinkers of the time “came to focus on the 
unfairness involved in the enforcement of contracts that resulted 
from greatly unequal bargaining power.”52 
Legal realism emerged as a response to the Lochner Court 
philosophy and took center stage with the New Deal, continuing a 
focus on government power as a remedy to unequal marketplace 
bargaining.  William H. Page makes explicit the link between legal 
realism, Progressive-era theory and imbalance of market power: 
At the heart of the [legal realist] challenge was an attack 
on the dichotomy between freedom of contract and 
coercive state intervention.  Realists argued that the 
“private” market was simply one form of coercive state 
ordering.  Robert Lee Hale, in particular, attempted to 
show that the common law market permitted the powerful 
to coerce the weak: “Each party to a bargain is forced by 
the bargaining power of the other to surrender certain 
property... or his freedom to act....  The economically 
strong retain a considerable residuum of liberty and 
property; the economically weak, very little.”...  [I]t bears 
emphasizing that these perspectives in New Deal ideology 
were not new.  They were direct descendants of 
progressive-era reform movements.53 
From the far right of the political spectrum, a Cato Institute 
publication has cited the same underlying principles for 
progressive legal traditions: 
As Epstein details, the Progressives, led by Justices Louis 
Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter, overthrew nearly a 
century-and-a-half of constitutional learning in the service 
of a single dubious economic theory: that economic 
‘progress’ required the creation of state-run monopolies 
to remedy the supposedly weak bargaining position of 
consumers and laborers.54 
Thus, the ideological underpinnings of modern state 
consumer protection laws, at least in substantial part, are literally 
Progressive in origin.  They focus on protecting the consumer by 
 
 52. Thomas A. Green, Freedom and Criminal Responsibility in the Age of Pound: 
An Essay on Criminal Justice, 93 MICH. L. REV 1915, 1916 (1995). 
 53. William H. Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust, 44 
EMORY L.J. 1, 13 (1995).  But see James A. Henretta, Charles Evan Hughes and the 
Strange Death of Liberal America, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. 115 (2006) (arguing that the 
prevailing view of the New Deal courts is inaccurate and its decisions were 
antithetical to progressive-era ideals). 
 54. Mark K. Moller, Introduction, 2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2005). 
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using government regulation to balance what Progressive thinkers 
have long considered to be the unfair bargaining power possessed 
by larger, more sophisticated marketplace sellers. 
Development of consumer protection law in Minnesota falls 
squarely within the national pattern for passage of consumer 
protection legislation.  Minnesota enacted a range of Progressive-
era legislation, and some prominent United States Supreme Court 
cases of the first half of the twentieth century concerned Minnesota 
statutes designed to protect farmers and consumers.55  Minnesota’s 
first statutory fraud law also came into existence during the 
Progressive era with the enactment in 1913 of the model Printer’s 
Ink statute in the form of the FSAA.56 
As with the rest of the nation, Minnesota created the core of its 
state consumer protection laws during an approximately twenty-
year period beginning in the early 1960s.  The CFA and the 
UDTPA were passed in 1963 and 1973, respectively, to make it 
easier to sue for misleading and deceptive marketplace practices.57  
The remedial private attorney general statute provided a private 
right of action for enforcement of consumer protection laws in 
1973.58  This period also included the passage of basic topical 
consumer laws, many of which provide important and well-known 
marketplace protections, such as: the right to obtain a replacement 
vehicle or refund for a defective new car purchase, known as the 
“lemon law;” the three business day right to cancel door-to-door 
sales agreements contained in the Home Solicitation Sales Act; and 
the right to obtain a written repair estimate and limit liability for 
excess costs under the Truth in Repairs Act.59 
Accepting for purposes of this article that individual 
consumers face an unequal marketplace position, and that 
correcting this unfair position through government legislation is a 
social benefit, brings us to the central question of this article: is 
Minnesota progressive in terms of private enforcement of 
consumer protections laws?  In other words, can consumers 
effectively enforce Minnesota consumer protection laws to remedy 
unequal marketplace bargaining power?  The private attorney 
 
 55. See, e.g., Henretta, supra note 53, at 137 (Minnesota rate regulation), 153–
54 (Minnesota mortgage moratorium). 
 56. MINN. STAT. § 8903 (1913 & Supp. 1917). 
 57. 1963 Minn. Laws 1533; 1973 Minn. Laws 420. 
 58. 1973 Minn. Laws 296. 
 59. MINN. STAT. §§ 325F.56, .665, 325G.06–.10 (2004). 
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general statute, the primary vehicle for private enforcement of 
consumer protection laws, was radically reinterpreted in 2000, so I 
focus the analysis on this development. 
III. JUDICIAL CREATION OF THE PUBLIC BENEFIT LIMIT FOR 
STATUTORY FRAUD ACTIONS 
The Minnesota Supreme Court charted a new course for use of 
the private attorney general statute in a 2000 decision, Ly v. 
Nystrom.60  This section analyzes the Ly decision and a subsequent 
Minnesota Supreme Court decision on the subject, Collins v. 
Minnesota School of Business.61 
A. Ly v. Nystrom 
Hoang Mihn Ly immigrated to the United States from 
Vietnam in 1981 at the age of 32.62  He had almost no formal 
education in Vietnam and neither spoke nor read much English.63  
Mr. Ly worked as a dishwasher and other jobs “neither requiring 
nor providing any business or management experience.”64  The 
defendant in the case, Kim Nystrom, also was from Vietnam but was 
fluent in English.65  The parties had become friends when both 
worked at a local restaurant.66 
In 1996, Ms. Nystrom offered to sell to Mr. Ly a restaurant 
named Chin Yung that she owned in Shakopee, Minnesota.67  At 
the core of the case was Ms. Nystrom’s oral statement to Mr. Ly that 
Chin Yung had gross revenues of $25,000 to $30,000 per month 
and monthly profits of $6,000 to $7,000.68  In truth, the restaurant’s 
monthly sales were only $6,000 to $7,000, or roughly the amount 
the defendant represented as the business’s monthly profit.69  
During the process of selling the restaurant, Ms. Nystrom 
repeatedly told Mr. Ly that he did not need a lawyer, and that she 
 
 60. 615 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 2000). 
 61. 655 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 2003). 
 62. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 305. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 306. 
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would not lie to him because they were friends.70  When Mr. Ly and 
his family first assumed control of the restaurant and complained 
to Ms. Nystrom about the lack of sales and other problems, she 
responded that this may be his fate and that he should see a 
fortune teller.71  When Mr. Ly fell behind in his loan payments to 
Ms. Nystrom, she threatened that his credit would be ruined and 
his home would be seized.72  When Ms. Nystrom, accompanied by 
an insurance agent, asked Mr. Ly to execute documents allowing 
her to take back control of the restaurant due to Mr. Ly’s failure to 
make payments, Mr. Ly indicated that he wanted a lawyer to 
evaluate the papers she was asking him to sign.73  Ms. Nystrom 
responded that failure to sign the documents by the next day would 
lead the police to take control of the restaurant, and that if Mr. Ly 
tried to get in, “they will lock you up.”74 
Mr. Ly eventually agreed to return control of the restaurant to 
Ms. Nystrom.75  Ms. Nystrom gave Mr. Ly a check for $2,500, 
allegedly to help him support his family, but she immediately 
stopped payment on the check.76  The same day Ms. Nystrom 
assumed control of the restaurant from Mr. Ly, she sold it to 
another buyer.77 
Mr. Ly filed suit against Ms. Nystrom alleging violations of 
common law fraud and the CFA.78  The trial court found for Mr. Ly 
on the common law fraud claim and awarded $25,000 in damages.79  
The trial court, however, found the CFA inapplicable because Ms. 
Nystrom’s statements were not made to the public at large and did 
not have the potential to deceive or ensnare others.80  The court of 
appeals upheld this decision, also finding no violation of the CFA 
because Mr. Ly was not a “consumer.”81 
The Minnesota Supreme Court separated the legal issues into 
two distinct matters.82  It reversed the lower court rulings as to the 
 
 70. Id. at 305. 
 71. Id. at 306. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 306–07. 
 78. Id. at 307. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 307; Ly v. Nystrom, 602 N.W.2d 644, 647 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). 
 82. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 307. 
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CFA.83  The court noted that the CFA was part of a wave of state 
statutory fraud laws enacted to “prohibit deceptive practices and to 
address the unequal bargaining power often present in consumer 
transactions.”84  The court also cited its prior statements that the 
CFA should be liberally construed in favor of protecting consumers 
and that the CFA reflected “a clear legislative policy encouraging 
aggressive prosecution of statutory violations.”85  Relying on these 
broad principles and past decisions, including the fact that the 
Minnesota State Legislature had overturned one of its prior 
decisions restrictively interpreting the CFA, the court reversed the 
lower courts and held that deceptive practices in an “isolated one-
on-one transaction” in a business context were actionable under 
the CFA.86 
Ms. Nystrom, however, prevailed in the case.  The Court 
looked to the private attorney general statute87 to insert limitations 
it found missing under the CFA.88  The court noted that the 
favorable remedies in the private attorney general statute “raised 
concern about how broadly the legislature intended the statute to 
be applied, particularly as it relates to common law fraud actions 
and recovery of attorney fees.”89  In particular, the court noted the 
use by the Minnesota Court of Appeals of Justice Simonett’s dissent 
in Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. WatPro, Inc., a previous 
decision interpreting the private right of action in the context of a 
CFA claim.90  In that case, a church was held to have a right to bring 
a CFA action after being deceived in the purchase of building 
construction services.91  Justice Simonett, in his Church of Nativity 
dissent, proposed a four-part test for limiting the award of attorney 
fees in CFA cases under the private attorney general statute.92  One 
of these four requirements was that the “plaintiff’s lawsuit has been 
 
 83. Id. at 310. 
 84. Id. at 308. 
 85. Id. (citing State v. Philip Morris, Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 495–96 (Minn. 
1996)). 
 86. Id. at 310. 
 87. MINN. STAT. § 8.31, subdiv. 3a (2004). 
 88. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 314. 
 89. Id. at 311. 
 90. Id. at 312 (citing Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. WatPro, Inc., 491 
N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1992)). 
 91. Id. at 311 n.16. 
 92. Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. WatPro, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 1, 11 
(Minn. 1992). 
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of benefit to the public.”93 
Without adopting the Simonett dissent, the court in Ly 
announced a “public benefit” limit on use of the private attorney 
general statute, restricting it to only “those claimants who 
demonstrate that their cause of action benefits the public.”94  The 
legal support for this holding was the court’s finding that the 
private attorney general statute provided individual recourse only if 
the cause of action would also have been within the attorney 
general’s authority to bring suit.95  The court stated that “the role 
and duties of the attorney general with respect to enforcing the 
fraudulent business practices laws must define the limits of the 
private claimant under the statute” and that “[s]ince the Private AG 
Statute grants private citizens the right to act as a ‘private’ attorney 
general, the role and duties of the attorney general with respect to 
enforcing the fraudulent business practices laws must define the 
limits of the private claimant under the statute.”96  Both statute and 
case law limit the attorney general’s authority to matters of public 
interest, the court reasoned, and thus the private right of action 
under section 8.31 should be so limited.97 
Rather than remand Mr. Ly’s case to the trial court for 
determination as to whether he met this newly imposed 
requirement, the court held as a matter of law that his case had no 
public benefit, and thus upheld dismissal of his CFA claim.98  The 
only fact relied on to support this conclusion was that Mr. Ly “was 
defrauded in a single one-on-one transaction in which the 
fraudulent misrepresentation, while evincing reprehensible 
conduct, was made only to appellant.”99 
The dissenters, Justices Page and Gilbert, stressed that section 
8.31 unambiguously states that “any person injured by a violation of 
the laws referred to in subdivision 1 may bring a civil action,” with 
the CFA specifically enumerated under subdivision 1.100  The 
dissent noted that an unambiguous statute should be given its plain 
meaning, and observed that there is no ambiguity in the language 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 314. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 313. 
 97. Id. at 313–14. 
 98. Id. at 314. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 315 (Page, J., dissenting in part and Gilbert, J., dissenting in part) 
(citing MINN. STAT. § 8.31, subdiv. 3a (2004)). 
17
Cox: Goliath Has the Slingshot: Public Benefit and Private Enforcement
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006
4. COX - RC - REFORMAT 1.DOC 12/15/2006  1:27:43 PM 
180 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1 
of the private attorney general statute allowing adoption of a public 
benefit limitation on suits for CFA violations.101  Justice Gilbert also 
argued that any successful prosecution of the CFA “has benefited 
the public by attempting to prevent the fraudulent business 
conduct of that particular defendant and alleviating, economically 
and in terms of time and preparation for investigation and 
litigation, the burden on the attorney general’s office to enforce 
the laws.”102  Thus, to the extent that the court read a “public 
benefit” requirement into the law, Justice Gilbert argued for 
finding that a successful prosecution of the CFA met this 
requirement.103 
B. Collins v. Minnesota School of Business 
In the only post-Ly decision by the Minnesota Supreme Court 
applying the public benefit limit, Collins v. Minnesota School of 
Business, the court affirmed the appellate court’s reversal of the 
trial court determination that the plaintiffs had not met the 
requirement of showing a public benefit.104  The plaintiffs in Collins 
were eighteen former trade school students who alleged that the 
school had made false and misleading statements in violation of 
both the FSAA and the CFA, inducing them to enroll in a sports 
medicine program.105  The alleged misrepresentations were made 
in broadcast advertisements, in sales presentations to prospective 
students, and in brochures.106  The plaintiffs accepted a Rule 68 
offer of settlement that included an award of “any costs and 
disbursements allowed by the District Court.”107  The trial court 
disallowed attorney’s fees under the private attorney general 
statute, finding that plaintiffs’ suit did not show a public benefit 
because “only a relatively small group of persons were injured by 
[the defendant’s] fraudulent activities.”108 
The Minnesota Supreme Court awarded attorney’s fees on 
finding that the suit provided a public benefit.109  The court held 
 
 101. Id. (Page, J., dissenting in part). 
 102. Id. at 316 (Gilbert, J., dissenting). 
 103. Id. 
 104. 655 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 2003). 
 105. Id. at 322. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 330. 
 109. Id. 
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that the trial court erred by focusing on the number of people 
injured as opposed to the breadth of the sales representations, 
which were directed “to the public at large.”110  The court applied 
the public benefit test to the FSAA claim, as well as the CFA 
claim.111 
IV.  THE NARROW CONSTRAINTS OF “PUBLIC BENEFIT” AS APPLIED IN 
SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS 
The Minnesota Supreme Court may (or may not) have 
intended Ly as a scalpel for use in selectively weeding out cases at 
the margin of public concern, but whatever the court’s initial 
intent, its decision has been wielded as a scythe by the lower state 
courts and the federal courts to dismiss statutory fraud claims by 
individuals. 
A. Results of Applying the Public Benefit Limit 
This section looks at the outcome of statutory fraud or topical 
consumer protection law cases that imposed the public benefit 
limit after Ly.  The first section analyzes cases that expressly apply 
the public benefit limit; the second subsection briefly notes cases 
decided under statutory fraud laws permitting plaintiff claims but 
not applying the public benefit limit.112 
1. Decisions Expressly Applying the Public Benefit Limit 
There is almost a perfect correlation between the outcome of 
cases expressly applying the public benefit limit and whether the 
plaintiff was an individual (or were family farmers), on the one 
hand, or a class or group of plaintiffs on the other hand.  Suits by 
the former were almost uniformly dismissed as not in the public 
interest; suits by the latter generally were found to be in the public 
benefit. 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Although Minnesota has three primary statutory fraud laws, the case law 
applying the public benefit test concerns the CFA and, to a lesser extent, the 
FSAA.  The third statutory fraud law, the UDTPA, has been repeatedly interpreted 
not to allow for a right of action under the private attorney general statute, and 
thus “public benefit” is not at issue.  See supra note 35. 
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a. Suits by Individuals 
The application of the public benefit limit by courts 
construing Minnesota law has resulted in the rejection of every 
consumer protection claim brought solely by an individual natural 
person or by family members, including family farmers also suing 
with a related family farm corporation.  Courts in twelve cases have 
expressly considered whether such plaintiffs asserting a claim 
under the statutory fraud laws met the public benefit limitation 
enunciated in Ly. 113  In every case, the court dismissed the claim. 114  
The result has been the same regardless of the court deciding the 
matter, with one decision of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit, three Minnesota Court of Appeals decisions, 
and eight decisions of the United States District Court for the 
District of Minnesota (“federal district court”) dismissing the 
plaintiffs’ statutory fraud claims.115  The same fate occurred with 
suits filed by individual plaintiffs in two cases where the court 
 
 113. See note 115 infra. 
 114. See note 115infra. 
 115. Davis v. U.S. Bancorp, 383 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 2004) (individual mortgage 
borrower); Kivel v. WealthSpring Mortgage Corp., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (D. Minn. 
2005) (individual mortgage borrower); Kalmes Farms, Inc. v. J-Star Indus., Inc., 
No. Civ. 02-1141, 2004 WL 114976 (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2004) (family farm claim 
against farm equipment manufacturer); Zutz v. Case Corp., No. Civ. 02-1776, 2003 
WL 22848943 (D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2003) (family farm claim against farm 
equipment manufacturer); Berczyk v. Emerson Tool Co., 291 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (D. 
Minn. 2003) (individual injured by radial saw from manufacturer); Flora v. 
Firepond, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 2d 780 (D. Minn. 2003) (two holders of stock 
options), aff’d sub nom. Syverson v. Firepond, Inc., 383 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. 2004); 
Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., No. Civ. 99-1550, 2003 WL 1571584 (D. Minn. 
Mar. 03, 2003) (trustee for next of kin in wrongful death suit); Behrens v. United 
Vaccines, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 965 (D. Minn. 2002) (family farm claim against 
vaccine manufacturer); Pecarina v. Tokai Corp., No. Civ. 01-1655, 2002 WL 
1023153 (D. Minn. May 20, 2002) (family sues manufacturer); Dickson v. 
Lundquist, No. A04-990, 2005 WL 147719 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2005) (married 
couple purchasing a boat); Duxbury v. Spex Feeds, Inc., 681 N.W.2d 380 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2004) (farm family claim against feed seller); Scally v. Norwest Mortgage, 
Inc., No. C4-02-2181, 2003 WL 22039526 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2003) 
(individual mortgage borrower).  This listing of cases includes those with multiple 
plaintiffs who are members of the same family and also includes family farm 
corporations.  See also Ponzo v. Affordable Homes of Rochester, No. A04-2234, 
2005 WL 1804644, at *2 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2005) (stating in a footnote 
that a one-on-one transaction is not actionable under the CFA, but upholding CFA 
claim because defendant did not raise the issue below).  But see Independent Glass 
Ass’n v. Safelite Group, Inc., No. 05-238, 2005 WL 2093035 (D. Minn. Aug. 26, 2005), 
which is discussed infra Part III.A.1.d.  Citations to collected lower court cases in 
this and subsequent notes are for decisions as of July 31, 2006. 
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analyzed public benefit in the context of topical consumer 
protection laws enforced under the private attorney general 
statute.116 
The following three cases, involving plaintiffs who were an 
individual, a married couple, and family farmers, exemplify the 
exclusionary reach of the public benefit limit: 
• Dickson v. Lundquist.117  Robert and Phyllis Dickson bought a 
Stratos boat from Riverview Sports & Marine in 1999.118  The 
Dicksons first encountered Riverview at a boat show where, 
according to the Dicksons, they were given a brochure listing the 
boat as a “promotional.”119  They later visited the Riverview 
dealership and were again given the brochure.120  The Dicksons 
allege that they were told the boat had only been used for 
promotional purposes.121  In fact, the boat had been previously sold 
and registered in North Carolina and returned to the dealer 
because the prior owner was dissatisfied with it.122  Riverview had 
purchased it from the manufacturer after the return.123  A Riverview 
salesperson informed the Dicksons that one other person was 
interested in the boat.124  The Riverview owner stated that he was 
unsure how the boat was listed in the brochure, and the brochure 
was not retained by the Dicksons.125  The trial court held that the 
Dickson’s evidence was “vague” and “questionable,” and found no 
public benefit allowing for a CFA claim.126 
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court ruling as not 
clearly erroneous and found that “[t]here is no clear proof of 
misrepresentation toward the public at large.”127  The court 
 
 116. Toth v. Arason, No. A04-769, 2005 WL 1216301 (Minn. Ct. App. May 17, 
2005) (attempting to enforce Truth in Repairs Act, Minnesota Statutes sections 
325F.56–.66), rev. granted (Minn. July 19, 2005); Jensen v. Duluth Area YMCA, 688 
N.W.2d 574 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (attempting to enforce Non-profit Corporation 
Act, Minnesota Statutes chapter 317A). 
 117. No. A04-990, 2005 WL 147719 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2005). 
 118. Id. at *1. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at *2.  The procedural posture in Dickson was similar to Collins.  See 
supra Part III.B. The plaintiffs had accepted a Rule 68 settlement offer and were 
litigating their attorney’s fee claim.  Id. at *1. 
 127. Id. at *2. 
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rejected as hypothetical the Dicksons’ argument that this would 
allow sellers to make false statements in serial fashion and escape 
CFA liability.128  The Dicksons also argued that Riverview’s false 
statements were broadly distributed because they were reiterated to 
the bank financing the purchase, at least one other possible 
customer, and the Department of Motor Vehicles.129  The court 
acknowledged these facts, but found that it “still cannot find the 
requisite showing of fraudulent inducement or public benefit 
under Ly and Collins.”130 
• Zutz v. Case Corp.131  The Zutz family owned and operated a 
farm in northwestern Minnesota.132  In 1998, they obtained an “air 
drill” manufactured by Case Corporation that mixed soil, seed, 
fertilizer, and herbicide for crop planting.133  According to the Zutz 
family, Case’s promotional material for the product and the dealer 
both stated that the air drill would work on fields treated with pre-
emergent herbicide.134  Plaintiffs experienced significantly poorer 
yields using the air drill for three years, 1998 through 2000.135  
During this time, the Zutz family worked with Case and the dealer 
to solve the problem and received a larger Case air drill for the 
2000 planting season.136  After the 2000 crops again showed poor 
yields, the Zutz family hired an agronomist, who ran dye tests and 
determined that the air drill failed to properly mix and distribute 
the inputs in soil treated with pre-emergent herbicide.137 
Case moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ common law fraud and 
CFA claims.138  The federal district court held that the Zutz family 
had properly pleaded common law fraud but dismissed the CFA 
claim for failure to show public benefit.139  As to the public 
distribution of the misleading claims, the court found that the 
 
 128. Id. at *3. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.  The Court of Appeals also held, without citation to the law regarding 
required proof for showing injury under the private attorney general statute, that 
the Dicksons had to show that the false representation regarding the boat’s prior 
ownership and use must have “by itself” induced them to purchase the boat.  Id. 
 131. No. Civ. 02-1776, 2003 WL 22848943 (D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2003). 
 132. Id. at *1. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at *2. 
 139. Id. at *6. 
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“case falls between the facts of Ly and... Collins,” and noted the 
representations were made in promotional materials that were 
publicly available.140  The court concluded that “[t]o determine 
whether a lawsuit is brought for the public benefit the Court must 
examine not only the form of the... misrepresentation, but also the 
relief sought by the plaintiff.”141  The court found no public benefit 
because the Zutz family sought only damages for their crop loss, 
and the court held there can be no public benefit when the 
plaintiff seeks only damages for their losses.142 
• Scally v. Norwest Mortgage.143  Virginia Scally sought a home 
refinancing loan from Wells Fargo.144  From May 1998 through 
November 1999 Ms. Scally engaged in a protracted interaction with 
Wells Fargo loan officer Donald Myhre.145  Ms. Scally alleged the 
following: that Mr. Myhre orally promised her a six-percent loan 
rate; that he failed to tell her that her loan application was denied 
due to an insufficient appraisal value; that he told her to stop 
making payments on her current loan; and that she attended what 
she thought was a closing with Mr. Myhre on the loan in September 
1999, but which Mr. Myhre considered only a “dry closing” at which 
the client signs documents for use at a later, final closing on the 
loan.146  As a result of being told to stop making payments on her 
current home loan, Ms. Scally’s loan went into foreclosure.147  Mr. 
Myhre personally, and ultimately Wells Fargo, made reinstatement 
payments on the foreclosed loan.148  Ms. Scally contended that the 
missed mortgage payments and foreclosure caused substantial 
harm to her credit and resulted in repeated denials of credit by 
other lenders.149  After discovering Myhre’s conduct, Wells Fargo 
terminated his employment.150 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment 
for Wells Fargo on numerous claims, but it held that the trial court 
 
 140. Id. at *4. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. No. C4-02-2181, 2003 WL 22039526 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2003). 
 144. Id. at *1.  Ms. Scally originally sought the loan from Norwest Mortgage, 
which later became Wells Fargo Mortgage.  Id. at *1 n.1. 
 145. Id.at *1. 
 146. Id. at *1–2. 
 147. Id. at *2. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
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properly dismissed the CFA claim for failure to show public 
benefit.151  The court determined that these facts fit squarely within 
the holding of Ly because Scally “engaged in a one-on-one 
transaction with Myhre.”152  The court rejected the argument that 
allowing a CFA claim would be of benefit to the public by providing 
incentives to lenders like Wells Fargo to better supervise its loan 
officers.153  The court focused on the particular circumstances of 
the case and noted that Wells Fargo had fired Myhre so that he was 
“no longer in any position to harm the public.”154  Borrowing a 
phrase from a federal district court case dismissing a CFA claim, 
the court held that Ms. Scally had not shown more than a 
“metaphysical potential” of public benefit from her suit.155 
b. Class Actions and Joinder Cases 
In the few CFA cases that expressly apply the public benefit 
limit brought in a class action or by multiple plaintiffs with joined 
claims, the plaintiffs have prevailed.  As noted above, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court allowed eighteen students to proceed 
with joined FSAA and CFA claims in Collins.156  In two state district 
court cases, the court has permitted class action CFA claims and 
determined that the plaintiffs’ case had a public benefit.157  The 
same result has occurred when the public benefit limit has been 
applied to statutes other than the CFA.  In three class action or 
joinder cases involving the application of Minnesota Statutes 
chapter 327C, which regulates mobile home parks, the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals has found a public benefit under Ly and allowed 
the claim to proceed under the private attorney general statute.158 
 
 151. Id. at *7. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. (citing Behrens v. United Vaccines, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 965, 971 (D. 
Minn. 2002)). 
 156. Collins v. Minn. Sch. of Bus., Inc., 655 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 2003). 
 157. Edwards v. Long Beach Mortgage Co., No. CT 02-16446, 2004 WL 
2137824 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 22, 2004); Ali v. Francois, No. CT 02-002459, 2003 
WL 23515768 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Nov. 05, 2003).  But see Weigand v. Walser Auto. 
Group, Inc., No. A05-1911, 2006 WL 1529511 (Minn. Ct. App. June 6, 2006) 
(finding no public benefit in putative class because of prior action by the attorney 
general). 
 158. Burtch v. Oakland Park, Inc., Nos. A05-1585, A05-1589, A05-1587, A05-
1588, 2006 WL 1806196 (Minn. Ct. App. July 3, 2006); Cavanaugh v. Hometown 
Am., L.L.C., No. A05-595, 2006 WL 696259 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2006), rev. 
24
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c. Business or Organizational Plaintiffs 
Courts have rejected under the public benefit limit most, but 
not all, claims where the plaintiff is a business or organization 
rather than a natural person or family farm.  The federal district 
court refused to dismiss a suit by an auto glass repair company 
alleging CFA violations by an insurer.159  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld a federal district court 
decision that found public benefit in a false advertising claim 
brought by a business against a competitor, but held that the 
purpose of the private attorney general statute would not be 
furthered by awarding attorney’s fees.160  The Minnesota Court of 
Appeals allowed a suit under the private attorney general statute 
for enforcement of mobile home park regulations.161  In the 
remaining six cases with a business plaintiff, the court found no 
public benefit and dismissed statutory fraud claims.162 
d. Independent Glass Association v. Safelite Group163 
The federal district court allowed an FSAA claim by an 
individual to proceed in a case brought jointly by a trade 
association for auto glass repair companies, a Minnesota resident 
who had obtained insurance proceeds for auto glass repairs, a 
similarly situated Nebraska resident and an anonymous 
independent insurance adjuster.164  The defendant in the case, 
 
denied (Minn. May 24, 2006); Schaff v. Chateau Cmtys., Inc., No. A04-1246, 2005 
WL 1734031 (Minn. Ct. App. July 26, 2005), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 2005). 
 159. Laysar, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. Civ. 04-4584, 2005 WL 
2063929 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2005). 
 160. Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 1379 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002), aff’g 134 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (D. Minn. 2001). 
 161. All Parks Alliance for Change v. Uniprop Manufactured Hous. Comtys. 
Income Fund, No. A05-912, 2006 WL 618932 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2006), rev. 
granted (Minn. May 24, 2006). 
 162. La Parilla, Inc. v. Jones Lang LaSalle Ams., Inc., No. 04-4080, 2006 WL 
2069207 (D. Minn. July 26, 2006); Evangelical Lutheran Church in Am. Bd. of 
Pensions v. Spherion Pac. Workforce, L.L.C.., No. 04-4791, 2005 WL 1041487 (D. 
Minn. May 04, 2005); Heaven & Earth, Inc. v. Wyman Props. Ltd. P’ship, No. Civ. 
03-3327, 2003 WL 22680935 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2003); Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook 
Borders, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Minn. 2003); Yarian v. Rainbow Foods 
Group, No. 01-1144, 2003 WL 24027721 (D. Minn. Mar. 18, 2003); Timeline, 
L.L.C. v. Williams Holdings # 3, L.L.C., 698 N.W.2d 181, 189 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2005), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 2005). 
 163. No. 05-238, 2005 WL 2093035 (D. Minn. Aug. 26, 2005). 
 164. Id. at *2. 
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Safelite, was a third-party administrator for insurance companies.165  
The trade association and the Minnesota resident alleged that 
Safelite violated the FSAA and the CFA by providing to insured 
consumers false and misleading information about independent 
glass repair businesses who contact Safelite as part of obtaining 
authorization for glass repairs.166  The court held that the trade 
association lacked standing to bring the statutory fraud claims, but 
refused to grant judgment on a motion to dismiss for lack of public 
benefit as to the statutory fraud claims by the Minnesota resident.167  
The court determined that this individual plaintiff may be able to 
show his claim benefited the public by introducing competition 
into the marketplace and ensuring the provision of more accurate 
information to insured consumers with auto glass repair claims.168 
2. Statutory Fraud Decisions Permitting Plaintiffs’ Claims But Not 
Addressing the Public Benefit Limit 
The majority of both federal and state cases deciding statutory 
fraud claims have done so without reference to the public benefit 
limit.169  After the Ly decision, courts in sixteen cases have allowed 
FSAA or CFA claims to proceed or upheld FSAA or CFA judgments 
for the plaintiffs.  The breakdown of these sixteen cases by type of 
plaintiff is as follows: eight were class actions, putative class actions 
or multiple plaintiffs with joined claims;170 five were business 
 
 165. Id. at *1. 
 166. Id. at *3. 
 167. Id. at *4–6. 
 168. Id. at *6.  The court allowed the Minnesota resident plaintiff’s FSAA claim 
to proceed, but dismissed the CFA claim as outside the scope of the CFA.  Id. at 
*6–8.  The other two individual plaintiffs did not allege statutory fraud claims.  Id. 
at *6 n.5 and *8 n.7.  The court also allowed an UDTPA claim by the Minnesota 
resident under the private attorney general statute, but did not discuss the 
contrary case law holding that the private attorney general statute does not extend 
to UDTPA claims.  Id. at *8.  See supra note 35 and accompanying text.  In a later 
decision, the court dismissed the statutory fraud claims, finding that the plaintiff 
could not prove he was injured or likely to be damaged.  Indep. Glass Ass’n v. 
Safelite Group, Inc., No. 05-238, 2005 WL 3079084, at *2 (D. Minn. Nov. 16, 
2005). 
 169. See infra notes 170–172, 304 and accompanying text. 
 170. Andrews v. Temple Inland Mortgage Corp., No. 00-1999, 2001 WL 
1136160 (D. Minn. Sept. 24, 2001); Meyer v. Dygert, 156 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (D. 
Minn. 2001); Johnson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. CX-01-1641, 2002 WL 1050426 
(Minn. Ct. App. May 22, 2002); Curtis v. Philip Morris Cos., No. PI 01-018042, 
2004 WL 2776228 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Nov. 29, 2004); Mitchell v. Chicago Title Ins. 
Co., No. CT 02-17299, 2004 WL 2137815 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 13, 2004); Schling 
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plaintiffs, primarily asserting statutory fraud claims against 
competitors or other businesses;171 and only three were individual 
plaintiffs.172 
In the sole permitted case brought by an individual consumer, 
Freeman v. A & J Auto MN, Inc., the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
reversed the trial court’s dismissal of a CFA claim.173  The plaintiff 
in that case alleged that a dealer of used cars told her that the car 
had a “salvage branded” title because of a prior theft when it was 
really because the car had been declared a total loss as a result of 
an accident.174  Kivel v. ABN AMRO Mortgage Group, Inc., was filed 
after the statutory fraud claims in a previous suit against the 
mortgage broker were dismissed for lack of public benefit.175  The 
court allowed claims that a mortgage lender had made false 
statements related to the processing of the plaintiff’s loan 
application.176  In Ponzo v. Affordable Homes of Rochester, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the plaintiff’s CFA claim 
because the defendant did not raise the public benefit issue before 
the trial court.177  In dicta, the court noted that a one-on-one 
transaction such as the conduct at issue in the case is not actionable 
 
v. Edina Realty Title, No. CT 02-018380, 2003 WL 23786984 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 
9, 2003).  Two cases were class actions certified by the federal district court, which 
have a long and complicated history of unreported federal district orders related 
to various matters in the litigation.  See In re St. Jude Med., Inc., 425 F.3d 1116 (8th 
Cir. 2005); In re Lutheran Bhd. Variable Ins. Prods. Co. Sales Practices Litigation, 
No. 99-MDL-1309, 2004 WL 2931352 (D. Minn. Dec. 16, 2004). 
 171. Wildlife Research Ctr., Inc. v. Robinson Outdoors, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 
1131 (D. Minn. 2005); AT&T Corp. v. Firmware of Minn., Inc., No. Civ. 02-1010, 
2004 WL 112632 (D. Minn. Jan. 20, 2004); Inter-Tel, Inc. v. CA Commc’ns, Inc., 
No. Civ. 02-1864, 2003 WL 23119384 (D. Minn. Dec. 29, 2003); Ott v. Target 
Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (D. Minn. 2001); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Leger, No. 
A04-260, 2004 WL 2711391 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 
26, 2005).  See also Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., 621 N.W.2d 2 
(Minn. 2001) (answering certified questions as to whether non-purchasers can 
bring a CFA claim and whether proof of individual justifiable reliance is required 
under the private attorney general statute). 
 172. Kivel v. ABN AMRO Mortgage Group, Inc., No. 05-2926, 2006 WL 
1579819 (D. Minn. June 1, 2006); Ponzo v. Affordable Homes of Rochester, 
L.L.C., No. A04-2234, 2005 WL 1804644 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2005); Freeman v. 
A & J Auto MN, Inc., No. A03-153, 2003 WL 22136807 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 
2003). 
 173. Freeman, 2003 WL 22136807, at *1. 
 174. Id. at *4–5. 
 175. Kivel v. WealthSpring Mortgage Corp., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1056 (D. 
Minn. 2005). 
 176. Kivel, 2006 WL 1579819, at *4. 
 177. Ponzo, 2005 WL 1804644, at *2 n.1. 
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in a private right of action under the CFA.178 
Most of the business cases involved suits between competitors, 
including several federal district court decisions applying the 
Lanham Act with ancillary Minnesota statutory fraud claims.  In Ott 
v. Target Corp., for example, the court treated an FSAA claim within 
the context of the Lanham Act and held that a doll manufacturer 
had raised a sufficient FSAA claim to survive summary judgment 
against makers and sellers of alleged knock-off products.179  In 
Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Leger, the plaintiff was a manufacturer of 
waste oil furnaces who sued a former distributor for selling 
modified furnaces as new and for representing himself as a 
distributor after his termination.180  The Minnesota Court of 
Appeals upheld a trial court judgment for the manufacturer, 
finding that there was sufficient evidence that the distributor had 
violated the CFA and allowing a partial award of attorney’s fees.181 
B. Rationale for Decisions Finding No Public Benefit 
There are two separate rationales underlying the result in the 
cases dismissed for lack of a public benefit.  First, courts have 
excluded CFA claims arising from the interaction between one 
buyer and one seller unless the plaintiffs can establish that the 
specific alleged deceptive representations were disseminated to, or 
the conduct was perpetrated on, the broader public.  This rationale 
is generally consistent with the language used by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in the Ly and Collins decisions.182 
The federal courts have adopted a formulation of the Ly public 
benefit standard which, in effect, almost categorically excludes 
statutory fraud claims by individuals.  In Davis v. U.S. Bancorp, the 
Eighth Circuit considered a CFA claim by an individual, Anitra 
Davis, who alleged that U.S. Bancorp made misrepresentations in 
the course of attempting to arrange a home mortgage for her.183  
Ms. Davis argued that she met the public benefit limitation 
“because her experience with U.S. Bank reflects its broad treatment 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. 153 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1069 & n.10, 1074 (D. Minn. 2001). 
 180. No. A04-260, 2004 WL 2711391, *1–3 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2004), rev. 
denied (Minn. Jan. 26, 2005). 
 181. Id. at *15. 
 182. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 310 (Minn. 2000); Collins v. Minn. Sch. of 
Bus., Inc., 655 N.W.2d 320, 329–30 (Minn. 2003). 
 183. 383 F.3d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 2004). 
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of others.”184  The court rejected this claim, stating: 
That argument, however, is the very foundation for the 
limitation elaborated in Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 314.  The class 
of plaintiffs under the private attorney general statute 
would be limitless if we assumed that one individual’s 
negative experience with a company was necessarily 
duplicated for every other individual and on that basis 
treated personal claims as benefiting the public.  Such an 
assumption might well render nearly every private suit 
alleging fraud a public benefit case.  Davis had a private 
transaction with U.S. Bank in which poor communication 
and confusion on both sides resulted in the cancellation 
of a purchase agreement.  But Davis can complain only 
about her individual experience with U.S. Bank, and she 
has not presented evidence that misrepresentations were 
made to the public at large.185 
Federal district court cases have summarized the public benefit 
limit as a near-blanket exclusion of individual claims, with 
statements such as: “the CFA does not provide a private right of 
action to individual consumers in ‘one-on-one’ transactions.”186  
Also, “[g]enerally, the Consumer Fraud Act does not provide a 
private right of action to individual consumers.  In limited 
circumstances, however, private remedies may be available through 
the Private Attorney General Act.”187 
A second rationale for these decisions is not readily apparent 
from a reading of the Ly and Collins decisions.  This rationale 
focuses on the relief sought by the plaintiff rather than whether the 
defendant’s representation or conduct was directed to the general 
public.  In these cases, courts dismissed CFA claims because the 
plaintiff could not obtain relief to benefit the public by stopping 
 
 184. Id. at 768. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Indep. Glass Ass’n v. Safelite Group, Inc., No. 05-238, 2005 WL 2093035, 
at *5 (D. Minn. Aug. 26, 2005); Evangelical Lutheran Church in Am. Bd. of 
Pensions v. Spherion Pac. Workforce L.L.C., No. 04-4791, 2005 WL 1041487, at *3 
(D. Minn. May 4, 2005). 
 187. Berczyk v. Emerson Tool Co., 291 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1019 (D. Minn. 
2003).  See also Laysar, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. Civ. 04-4584, 
2005 WL 2063929, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2005); Pecarina v. Tokai Corp., No. 
Civ. 01-1655, 2002 WL 1023153, at *5 (D. Minn. May 20, 2002) (stating that 
“[n]either the Consumer Fraud Act nor the False Advertising Act provide a private 
right of action to individual consumers.  In limited circumstances, however, 
private remedies may be available to individuals through the Private Attorney 
General Act.”). 
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continued deceptive conduct by the defendant, even though there 
was no dispute in many cases that the alleged deceptive 
representations or conduct was widely disseminated.  In several 
cases, the court held that there was no public benefit because the 
defendant withdrew the product and accompanying sales program 
from the market by the time of the court’s decision.188  Courts have 
also found that the plaintiff’s failure to request injunctive relief, 
seeking instead only damages, is a basis for finding no public 
benefit.189 
The federal district court found that no CFA claims are 
possible in a wrongful death suit in Minnesota, even if based on 
widely disseminated deceptive sales representations, because no 
public benefit can be shown when Minnesota law limits wrongful 
death actions to the recovery of pecuniary loss for surviving family 
members.190  Similarly, in a decision following a reversal and 
remand by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals held that the plaintiff’s suit in Wiegand v. Walser Automotive 
Group provided no public benefit because the Attorney General 
had already reached a settlement with the defendant that provided 
for both injunctive relief and arbitration rights for aggrieved 
consumers.191 
V. THE PUBLIC BENEFIT LIMIT OVERTURNED PRIOR CASE LAW 
The public benefit limit contradicts long-standing notions 
about, and use of, the private right of action to enforce violations 
of Minnesota statutory fraud laws.  The court in Ly did not 
acknowledge this prior case law.  Instead, the Ly decision stated 
 
 188. Berczyk, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 1019 n.18; Behrens v. United Vaccines, Inc., 
228 F. Supp. 2d 965, 972 (D. Minn. 2002); Pecarina, 2002 WL 1023153, at *5 n.3.  
See also Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., No. Civ. 99-1550, 2003 WL 1571584, at *6 
(D. Minn. Mar. 3, 2003) (holding that FDA-imposed warnings on smokeless 
tobacco accomplish the purpose of warning the public, and finding no public 
benefit). 
 189. Kalmes Farms, Inc. v. J-Star Indus., Inc., No. Civ. 02-1141, 2004 WL 
114976, at *6 (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2004); Zutz v. Case Corp., No. Civ. 02-1776, 2003 
WL 22848943, at *4 (D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2003); Behrens, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 972; 
Pecarina, 2002 WL 1023153, at *5. 
 190. Tuttle, 2003 WL 1571584, at *7. 
 191. No. A05-1911, 2006 WL 1529511, at *3 (D. Minn. June 6, 2006) (stating 
that “there is no longer any public benefit to protect because the attorney 
general’s office has already intervened to correct the complained-of sales activity 
and provided a remedy for aggrieved consumers”).  See also Tuttle, 2003 WL 
1571584, at *6. 
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that its ruling was consistent with lower court decisions under the 
private attorney general statute, and decisions from courts in other 
states.192  These decisions, however, stand for very different 
propositions. 
A. Prior Case Law Involving Claims In One-On-One Transactions 
Prior to Ly, individual plaintiffs routinely used the CFA and 
FSAA to obtain recoveries in situations of “one-on-one 
transactions.”193  Examples of reported decisions by the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals in cases of this nature include the following: an 
individual who hired a household goods moving company; a family 
that made an investment at a bank; a contractor who purchased a 
“garage kit;” an individual who bought a horse; and a farmer who 
bought grain silos.194  The Ly decision made no mention of these or 
numerous other similar cases whose result it almost surely 
overturned. 
In addition to reaching a different result, prior cases employed 
legal principles and presumptions for the application of the private 
attorney general statute that are directly contrary to the public 
benefit limit doctrine.  Earlier cases presumed that the primary 
reason for passage of the private attorney general statute was to 
allow, not exclude, suits in individual, one-on-one transactions 
involving small sums of money.  In a 1998 federal district court 
decision, Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., the plaintiffs were a married 
couple seeking damages for the wife’s sterility resulting from use of 
 
 192. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 312 & n.18 (Minn. 2000). 
 193. Kronebusch v. MVBA Harvestore Sys., 488 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1992); Elgharbawi v. Selly, 483 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); LeSage v. 
Norwest Bank Calhoun-Isles, N.A., 409 N.W.2d 536 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Eager 
v. Siwek Lumber & Millwork, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Yost v. 
Millhouse, 373 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
 194. Kronebusch, 488 N.W.2d at 490 (farmer purchasing grain storage silos); 
Elgharbawi, 483 N.W.2d at 490 (individual hired a household goods moving 
company); LeSage, 409 N.W.2d at 536 (family making an investment); Eager, 392 
N.W.2d at 691 (contractor purchasing a “garage kit”); Yost, 373 N.W.2d at 826 
(individual purchasing a horse).  The same is true of cases brought by individuals 
enforcing topical consumer protection laws enforceable through the private 
attorney general statute.  See, e.g., infra notes 268–271 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Minnesota Supreme Court decision in Jacobs v. Rosemount Dodge-
Winnebago South, 310 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1981) (mobile home owners have claim 
for violation of topical consumer protection law enforceable as per se violation of 
the CFA)). 
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the defendant’s contraceptive device.195  The plaintiff asserted CFA 
and FSAA claims, among other causes of action.196  The court 
rejected an argument by defendant Searle that the private attorney 
general statute is limited to situations of “direct buyer-to-seller sales 
in cases which occur too quickly or on too small a scale to bring the 
attorney general’s enforcement powers to bear.”197  The court cited, 
in part, a Minnesota Court of Appeals decision, Liess v. Lindemyer, in 
agreeing with Searle that “[i]t is without doubt that a primary 
purpose in adopting the private attorney general provisions of the 
Consumer Fraud Act was to encourage lawyers to accept cases 
where damages may be so small as to erect ‘financial barriers to the 
vindication of a plaintiff’s right.’”198  The court held that suits under 
the private attorney general statute should not be limited only to 
these small matters that were its “primary purpose.”199  Similarly, in 
a 1992 Minnesota Court of Appeals decision, Kronebusch v. MVBA 
Harvestore System, the court allowed recovery under the private 
attorney general statute in a FSAA claim by a farmer involving his 
purchase of grain storage silos, even though the court agreed that 
“the primary purpose of the statute is to encourage lawyers to 
accept cases where nominal damages erect financial barriers to 
litigation.”200 
The courts in Kociemba and Kronebusch were struggling with the 
legal issue of whether the private attorney general statute extended 
beyond individual marketplace transactions involving small sums.  
The public benefit limit turns this earlier framework on its head, 
finding that the private attorney general statute has the opposite 
purpose of precluding a private right of action in small, individual 
transactions. 
The public benefit limit also represents a break from long-
standing case law holding that establishing liability for common law 
fraud is sufficient to sustain a CFA claim in a private right of action.  
In the 1985 case Yost v. Millhouse,201 the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
found that a seller of a horse misrepresented whether the horse was 
 
 195. 707 F. Supp. 1517 (D. Minn. 1989). 
 196. Id. at 1523 (the other causes of action included “defective design, 
defective manufacture, failure to warn, [and] failure to test”). 
 197. Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1304 (D. Minn. 1988). 
 198. Id. (citing Liess v. Lindemyer, 354 N.W.2d 556, 558 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1984)). 
 199. Id. 
 200. 488 N.W.2d 490, 494–95 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
 201. 373 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
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registered and the court awarded $50 in damages under the 
plaintiff’s common law fraud claim.202  The court held that as a 
result of finding for the plaintiff on common law fraud: “[a]s a 
matter of law, the fraud constitutes a violation of the Consumer 
Protection Act for which reasonable attorney’s fees are 
recoverable.”203  Ly held the opposite—that the plaintiff had no 
right to bring a private right of action to recover damages for a 
violation of the CFA even though the defendant had been found 
liable under common law fraud.204 
B. Public Benefit Limits Imposed in Other Cases and Jurisdictions 
The Court in Ly noted three Minnesota Court of Appeals 
decisions, as well as cases from other jurisdictions with similar 
court-imposed requirements.  Each of the cited decisions counsels 
rejection, not adoption, of the public benefit limit. 
1. Minnesota Court of Appeals Cases Cited in Ly 
The Court in Ly cited three Minnesota Court of Appeals cases 
that it read as requiring “a showing of public benefit to award 
attorney fees under the Private AG Statute.”205  The reasoning and 
result of these cases is utterly incompatible with the public benefit 
limit for the same three reasons in each case: (1) the case would 
have been dismissed under the public benefit limit; (2) the court 
awarded or increased attorney’s fees under the private attorney 
general statute because doing so was necessary to promote claims 
by individuals, including possible plaintiffs with nominal damages; 
and (3) the court used “public interest” as a factor to determine 
 
 202. Id. at 830–31. 
 203. Id. at 831. 
 204. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 314 (Minn. 2000). 
 205. Id. at 312.  The Court also cited two federal district court cases as support 
for imposing the public benefit limit. See id. at 312 n.18.  In Cooperman v. R.G. Barry 
Corp., the court was interpreting the reach of the CFA itself, not the private 
attorney general statute.  775 F. Supp. 1211 (D. Minn. 1991).  The court held that 
an employment dispute did not occur “in connection with the sale of any 
merchandise,” as required to prove a CFA claim.  Id. at 1213 (citing MINN. STAT. § 
325F.69 (2004)).  Given the Ly court’s sharp distinction between the requirements 
for liability under the CFA and the scope of the private attorney general statute, 
Cooperman is irrelevant to the issue before the Court in Ly.  The other case cited by 
the court, Martin v. Hancock, was literally a dog bite case decided under federal 
civil rights law with no discussion remotely related to excluding all one-on-one 
transactions from a private right of action.  466 F. Supp. 454 (D. Minn. 1979). 
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the amount of the fee award, not as a precondition to a private 
action to enforce statutory fraud laws. 
In Liess v. Lindemyer, the plaintiff was an individual who 
brought a CFA claim relating to the sale of her home,206 a typical 
one-on-one transaction not actionable under the public benefit 
limit.  Liess prevailed at trial and was awarded $6,787.207  Ms. Liess 
requested over $12,000 in attorney’s fees but was awarded only 
$2,500 by the trial court on the theory that this amount 
represented a fair proportion of the damage award.208  On appeal 
by Liess, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the attorney’s 
fee award and stated that hourly attorney’s fee awards were 
appropriate even if the fees exceeded the amount of the damage 
award.209  The court held that the purpose of the private attorney 
general statute was to “eliminate financial barriers to the 
vindication of a plaintiff’s rights, and the award should provide 
incentive for counsel to act as private attorney general.”210  The 
court quoted extensively from a case decided under federal 
consumer credit laws that noted the importance of encouraging 
lawyers to take cases even if the damage awards are small.211  The 
court also mentioned that on remand the trial court should 
consider the public interest benefit of the suit.212  This statement 
was made in the context of a remand to increase the amount of the 
attorney’s fee for an individual plaintiff, not to preclude suits such 
as the one brought by Liess. 
In Wexler v. Brothers Entertainment Group, Inc., a father brought a 
CFA claim against the operator of a pay-per-call telephone trivia 
game used by his son.213  The trial court granted summary 
judgment to the defendant and Wexler appealed.214  The 
Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, finding fact issues as to 
liability for $11.89 in phone charges.215  The court noted that the 
attorney general had entered into a settlement with the defendant 
for comprehensive injunctive relief, but held that the issue of 
 
 206. 354 N.W.2d 556, 557 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 558. 
 210. Id. (citations omitted). 
 211. Id. (citing Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 689 F.2d 72 (6th Cir. 1982)). 
 212. Id. 
 213. 457 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 222. 
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whether Wexler could obtain further relief should be reserved until 
after trial.216  The court noted in dicta that if Wexler prevailed on 
remand he was entitled to attorney’s fees, and cited Liess for the 
proposition that the amount of that award should reflect the public 
purposes of the statute.217  Nothing in this ruling upholding the 
right to bring a CFA claim for less than $12 after the attorney 
general has reached a settlement with the defendants supports the 
Ly court’s public benefit limit on bringing suit under the private 
attorney general statute. 
Finally, in Untiedt v. Grand Laboratories, Inc., a farmer sued a 
vaccine manufacturer after use of the vaccine resulted in health 
problems for the farmer’s cattle and reduced dairy production.218  
These facts are almost identical to the recent federal district court 
decision in Behrens v. United Vaccines, Inc., in which the court 
dismissed a CFA claim by a mink farmer as failing to meet the 
public benefit limit.219  The jury found for the Untiedts, awarding 
over $1 million in damages, and the court thereafter awarded 
attorney’s fees to the Untiedts as the prevailing plaintiff on the CFA 
claim.220  In upholding the award of attorney’s fees, the court of 
appeals cited Liess regarding the need for providing incentives to 
counsel to take such cases, and that the amount of the award 
should include consideration of the public interest.221  The court 
found that the trial court’s award of fees in this case was proper 
“because the agricultural community has been particularly 
susceptible to misrepresentation and the possibility of an award 
would provide an incentive for experienced litigators to take on 
similar cases.”222 
2. Other States With Public Benefit Limits 
The court in Ly also stated that “[o]ther state courts have 
similarly held that a public purpose must be demonstrated.”223  The 
two decisions cited from other state courts were Lightfoot v. 
 
 216. Id. at 223. 
 217. Id. at 222–23 (citations omitted). 
 218. No. C4-94-772, 1994 WL 714308, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 1994). 
 219. 228 F. Supp. 2d 965, 969–71 (D. Minn. 2002). 
 220. Untiedt, 1994 WL 714308, at *1. 
 221. Id. at *3. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 312 n.18 (Minn. 2000). 
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MacDonald224 in Washington and Brody v. Finch Univ. of Health 
Sciences225 in Illinois.  The experience of these states, however, 
provides guidance on the difficulty of applying and sustaining the 
public benefit limit rather than support for such a judicially 
imposed rule. 
The State of Washington has the most extensive history with a 
public benefit limit and is the only other state to directly tie the 
public benefit test for state statutory fraud actions to the authority 
of the attorney general of the state.  In Lightfoot v. MacDonald, the 
Washington Supreme Court held “that an act or practice of which a 
private individual may complain must be one which also would be 
vulnerable to a complaint by the Attorney General” to support a 
private suit under the Washington Consumer Protection Act.226  In 
1980, just four years after Lightfoot was decided, the Washington 
Supreme Court affirmed the public interest requirement, but 
abandoned the association between the reach of the private right 
of action and the authority of that state’s attorney general.227  In 
Anhold v. Daniels, the court observed that “[t]he ‘Attorney General’ 
test for sufficiency of public interest appears to have been little 
utilized or understood and apparently has yielded conflicting 
results.”228  Since Anhold, the Washington courts have continued to 
struggle with applying the judicially imposed “public interest” limit.  
In Hangman Ridge Training Stables v. Safeco Title Insurance Co., 
decided six years later in 1986, the Washington Supreme Court 
revisited the issue and substituted a five-element test for the three-
factor test articulated in Anhold.229  A series of commentators have 
repeatedly urged the reformation or abandonment of the 
Washington public interest test in its various permutations.230  In 
 
 224. 544 P.2d 88 (Wash. 1976). 
 225. 698 N.E.2d 257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). 
 226. 544 P.2d at 90.  The Washington Supreme Court relied on specific 
language in the purpose statement of the Washington Consumer Protection Act 
and the incorporation of a reference to the Federal Trade Commission Act as a 
basis for reaching this result, neither of which are present in the relevant 
Minnesota laws.  Id. 
 227. See Anhold v. Daniels, 614 P.2d 184 (Wash. 1980). 
 228. Id. at 187.  The Ly majority noted Lightfoot as support for its decision, but 
failed to note that the rationale in that case was overturned.  615 N.W.2d at 312 
n.18. 
 229. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 
531, 535 (Wash. 1986). 
 230. See David J. Dove, Comment, Washington Consumer Protection Act -- Public 
Interest and the Private Litigant, 60 WASH. L. REV. 201 (1984); Susan Clyatt Lybeck, 
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Hangman Ridge, the Washington Supreme Court observed that “our 
public interest requirement has been subject to harsh criticism.”231 
The Ly court also cited the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act as 
having been interpreted to support a public interest limit on 
suits.232  In fact, the Illinois case cited by the Court in Ly explained 
that the judicially created “public interest” limit on suits under the 
Illinois CFA had been overturned by the Illinois Legislature.233  The 
case of Brody v. Finch University of Health Sciences234 discussed a 
separate “consumer nexus” requirement for finding a violation of 
the Illinois CFA, which is akin to a limiting principle related to the 
scope of the CFA that the Ly court rejected in reversing the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals on the issue of whether a CFA 
violation had occurred.235 
 
Note, New Consumer Protection Private Action Test: Clarification or Further Confusion?--
Hangman Ridge Training Stables v. Safeco Title Insurance Co., 62 WASH. L. REV. 
277 (1987); Jonathan A. Mark, Comment, Dispensing with the Public Interest 
Requirement in Private Causes of Action Under the Washington Consumer Protection Act, 
29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 205 (2005); Milton G. Rowland, Comment, The Consumer 
Protection Act Private Right of Act: A Reevaluation, 19 GONZ. L. REV. 673, 675–77 
(1984); Susan K. Storey, Note, On the Propriety of the Public Interest Requirement in the 
Washington Consumer Protection Act, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 143 (1986). 
 231. 719 P.2d at 536. 
 232. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 312 n.18 (Minn. 2000). 
 233. Id. (“[T]he 1990 amendment to the Consumer Fraud Act dispensed with 
any requirement previously imposed by the courts that a plaintiff prove a public 
injury, a pattern, or an effect on consumers generally to maintain an action under 
the Consumer Fraud Act.” (quoting Brody v. Finch Univ. of Health Scis., 698 
N.E.2d 257, 269 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998))).  See Act of Jan. 1, 1990, ch. 121 1/2, para. 
270a, 1989 Ill. Laws 4230, 4230–31 (codified as amended at 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
505/10a (2004 West)).  See also Joseph G. Feehan, The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act 
and the “Public Injury” Debate, 80 ILL. B.J. 136 (1992); Clinton A. Krislov, The Illinois 
Consumer Fraud Act: Hey! Where Did the Strict Constructionists Go? Judicial Add-Ons Are 
Ruining a Perfectly Good Statute, 11 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 224 (1999) (discussing 
Brody and other cases reflecting judicial activism as limiting the plain language of 
the Illinois CFA).  The Connecticut legislature also has overturned the imposition 
of a similar “public interest nexus” requirement imposed by the Connecticut 
Supreme Court in Ivey v. Indian Harbor Props., Inc., 461 A.2d 1369 (Conn. 1983).  
Similar to the comparable Illinois statute, the law overturning this decision states: 
“Proof of public interest or public injury shall not be required in any action 
brought under this section.”  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g(a) (West 2004).  
Only Colorado, Georgia, Nebraska, and South Carolina have remaining valid 
judicial decisions creating public benefit restrictions on private suits under their 
state statutory fraud laws.  Hall v. Walter, 969 P.2d 224, 235 (Colo. 1998); Zeeman 
v. Black, 273 S.E.2d 910, 914 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980); Nelson v. Lusterstone Surfacing 
Co., 605 N.W.2d 136, 141 (Neb. 2000); LaMotte v. Punch Line of Columbia, Inc., 
370 S.E.2d 711, 713 (S.C. 1988). 
 234. 698 N.E.2d 257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). 
 235. Compare Brody, 698 N.E.2d at 269, with Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 308–10. 
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VI. INTERPRETATIVE GAPS IN THE PUBLIC BENEFIT LIMIT 
The application by Minnesota courts of the public benefit limit 
in Ly raises the question of whether the Minnesota Supreme Court 
intended the outcome of its decision—the virtual elimination of 
CFA claims by individuals and family farmers.236  The Ly decision 
left the following four unresolved analytical problems that make 
resolution of this question uncertain, or which may make the legal 
underpinnings of this outcome difficult to sustain: (1) the failure to 
identify specific standards for applying the public benefit limit; (2) 
concerns related to tying the legal basis of the public benefit limit 
to the attorney general’s authority; (3) the need for factual 
development regarding the existence of a public benefit; and (4) 
the failure to articulate the reach of the public benefit test for 
consumer protection laws other than the CFA. 
A. The Lack of Standards for Applying the Public Benefit Limit 
The Ly case put no clear decisional principles in place for how 
courts were to apply the “public benefit” limit.  An early 
commentator on the case observed: “[T]he lack of precise 
standards used by the courts in determining whether the 
requirement in Ly is met has not lent much guidance to trial 
courts, who are left to apply a version of Justice Potter Stewart’s ‘I 
know it when I see it’ theory to the public benefit rule.”237  In 
 
 236. The majority decision in Ly cited legislative history in support of its ruling 
that private actions should be limited to the authority of the attorney general.  Ly, 
615 N.W.2d at 311.  However, that legislative history refers specifically to claims by 
individuals: “On March 8, 1973, Senator Winston Borden, author of the bill, in a 
hearing before the Labor and Commerce Committee, stated that its goal was to: 
‘allow the individual person to bring a civil action for the damages he sustained.’”  
Id. (citation omitted).  The cited legislative history further states “if a[n] individual 
could bring an action, he can do some of the prosecuting, he can do some of the 
enforcing, he can provide some of the protection for himself and others that the 
Attorney General’s Office . . . can not do today.”  Id.  In its later decision in Group 
Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., the court focused on the language in the 
private attorney general statute allowing “any person injured” by a violation to 
bring a claim, and quoted more of Senator Borden’s testimony referring to claims 
by “an individual.”  621 N.W.2d 2, 10 (Minn. 2001). 
 237. Nancy E. Brasel, Ad Hoc Deceptions in Private Disputes: When Does a Private 
Plaintiff Confer a Public Benefit Under Minnesota’s Private Attorney General Statute?,  29 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 321, 331 (2002).  See also Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 
No. Civ. 99-1550, 2003 WL 1571584, at *5 (D. Minn. Mar. 3, 2003) (citing the 
Brasel article and noting that the “Ly court did not, however, set forth any 
standard for determining when a cause of action benefits the public”). 
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finding no public benefit in Dickson v. Lundquist, the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals similarly stated: “The term ‘public benefit’ is 
subjective... the term can be about what you want it to be.”238 
Even after Collins, the court has not definitively resolved 
whether there is an exclusion of all “one-on-one” transactions, and 
if so, what this exclusion means.  In neither Ly nor Collins did the 
court affirmatively state that a public benefit cannot be found in a 
suit involving a single buyer and seller.239  Assuming that individual 
consumers can ever prove public dissemination sufficient to sustain 
an individual claim, it is unclear what a plaintiff must show to prove 
public benefit and survive dismissal by the court.  For example, 
does the public benefit limit exclude sales transactions in which the 
seller makes deceptive oral representations that may possibly be, 
would probably be or definitely have been made to other 
consumers?  If such statements should be considered, do they have 
to be the same or substantially similar to the statements made to 
other consumers, or is it enough that the seller makes repeatedly 
false statements of various content to different buyers?  Is it enough 
that similar statements were made to one other consumer, a few 
other consumers, hundreds of other consumers, or broadcast to 
many more?  Does the severity or intentionality of the alleged 
deception bear on this determination? 
Nor is it clear from Ly and Collins that the public benefit limit 
should require the plaintiff to obtain injunctive relief or otherwise 
demonstrate that his or her particular lawsuit will effectively stop 
the challenged deceptive practice, as numerous courts applying the 
doctrine have held.  Because the court in Ly found that the 
transaction was a “single one-on-one transaction,”240 it never had to 
reach the issue of whether forcing a defendant to pay individual 
damages for a more widely disseminated practice was sufficient to 
constitute a public benefit.  In Collins, the court suggested the 
opposite—that the focus on the public benefit limit is on breadth 
of the sales practice, not the number of people seeking relief in the 
suit or the impact of the relief on the broader public.241 
 
 238. Dickson v. Lundquist, No. A04-990, 2005 WL 147719, at *2 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Jan. 25, 2005). 
 239. See Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 2000); Collins v. Minn. Sch. Of 
Bus., 655 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 2003). 
 240. 615 N.W.2d at 309. 
 241. See Collins, 655 N.W.2d at 330.  In a footnote in Ly, however, the court 
stated that the award of investigative fees to prevailing plaintiffs is implicit support 
for its decision because investigative costs in a “private dispute . . . would be of 
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B. Reference to Attorney General Authority 
The one defining principle for the public benefit limit 
articulated in Ly, and the only legal grounding for the decision, is 
that the reach of the private right of action is the same as the limits 
on the authority of the attorney general to enforce the CFA.242  In 
responding to the dissenters’ argument that the public benefit limit 
was nowhere to be found in the language of section 8.31, the 
majority noted that “our analysis is based on the statutory authority 
of the attorney general.”243  A closer look at the authority of the 
attorney general, however, highlights a critical analytical concern 
with the public benefit limit. 
The attorney general’s authority to enforce consumer 
protection laws is subjective and discretionary.  As the Ly majority 
noted, the attorney general may appear “in all civil causes of like 
nature in all other courts of the state whenever, in the attorney 
general’s opinion, the interests of the state require it.”244  The Ly 
majority also cited Slezak v. Ousdigian for the proposition that the 
attorney general “may institute, conduct and maintain all such 
actions and proceedings as he deems necessary for the... protection 
of public rights.”245  The public benefit limit, then, is based on the 
“opinion” of the current attorney general who takes the actions “he 
deems necessary” in the public interest.246 
This obviously is a problematic interpretative principle for 
restricting a private right of action.  Presumably, the attorney 
general could opine as to the public interest of a particular private 
action before the court, which repeatedly occurred when the state 
of Washington had a similar, short-lived rule of law imposed by the 
judiciary.247  The attorney general could even issue an opinion 
letter stating that there is a public benefit in the prosecution of any 
 
benefit only to the private party defrauded.”  615 N.W.2d at 314 n.24. 
 242. See Ly, 615 N.W.2d 302.  The court reiterated this point in Anderson-
Johanningmeier v. Mid-Minnesota Women’s Ctr., Inc., 637 N.W.2d 270, 276 (Minn. 
2002). 
 243. Ly, 615 N.W.2d. at 314 n.22. 
 244. Id. at 313 n.20 (citing MINN. STAT. § 8.01 (1998)) (emphasis added).  The 
attorney general also has express authority to “enforce the provisions of law 
relating to consumer fraud and unlawful practices” in the CFA.  MINN. STAT. § 
8.32, subdiv. 2(a) (2004). 
 245. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 313 (citing Slezak v. Ousdigian, 260 Minn. 303, 308, 
110 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 1961)). 
 246. See id. 
 247. See Anhold v. Daniels, 614 P.2d 184, 188 (Wash. 1980). 
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“one-on-one” transaction, or certain types of such transactions, that 
violate the CFA.  In part, this was the position of Justice Gilbert’s 
dissent.248  Therefore, the meaning of Ly might change with each 
successive attorney general or each opinion by the attorney 
general. 
The holding in Ly suggests that the attorney general would 
have had no authority to bring a CFA action against the 
“reprehensible conduct” of the defendant in that case if the 
attorney general had decided to do so.  In support of this assertion, 
the Ly Court cited Humphrey v. McLaren for the proposition that “a 
government litigator must take positions with the common public 
good in mind, unlike the private practitioner who seeks vindication 
of a particular result for a particular client.”249  The fact that public 
attorneys act with different motives than the private bar is a wholly 
different issue than whether the attorney general has authority to 
enforce state law in a given marketplace transaction between a 
buyer and seller, such as the transaction underlying Ly, if the 
attorney general exercises his or her discretion to do so.  Neither 
McLaren nor other cases on the powers of the attorney general 
prohibit the attorney general from bringing suit in a fraudulent 
transaction between one buyer and one seller.  Minnesota courts 
have consistently held that the attorney general can determine 
what constitutes the public interest for purposes of filing suit.  Over 
seventy years ago, in State ex rel. Peterson v. City of Fraser,250 the 
Minnesota Supreme Court made clear the broad scope of the 
attorney general’s power: 
... [I]nasmuch as the Attorney General in his discretion 
decided that he should proceed, there is nothing for any 
court to pass upon as to the necessity for or policy of 
proceeding.  In that field, the discretion of the Attorney 
General is plenary.  He is a constitutional officer (Minn. 
Const. art. 5, § 1), and, as such, the head of the state’s 
legal department.  His discretion as to what litigation shall 
or shall not be instituted by him is beyond the control of 
any other officer or department of the state.251 
That a public attorney must act in the public interest is not a 
 
 248. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 316 (Gilbert, J., dissenting in part). 
 249. Id. at 313 n.9 (citing Humphrey v. McLaren, 402 N.W.2d 535, 543 (Minn. 
1987)). 
 250. 191 Minn. 427, 254 N.W. 776 (1934). 
 251. Id. at 432, 254 N.W. at 778–79. 
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resolution of the analytical problem of basing a private right of 
action on the subjective view of the attorney general as to what 
constitutes the public interest.  Nothing in the private attorney 
general statute suggests that the attorney general’s discretion to 
determine the public interest should be transferred wholesale to 
the judiciary so that the court can decide in each case whether it 
believes the private litigant is acting for the public benefit. 
Consider the situation of an ill, elderly woman who owns her 
home without encumbrance.  She is visited by a solicitor who 
convinces her to transfer to him title to the property in exchange 
for three years of free rent and a package of in-home services that 
he falsely claims “are worth $150,000 and will provide all your 
health care and life activity needs.”  In truth, the services are of 
limited use to the elderly homeowner and she is faced with eviction 
at the end of the three-year lease.  This situation fits squarely into 
the “single one-on-one transaction” described in Ly and subsequent 
cases.  The rationale underlying this result is that a private right of 
action is not authorized in this situation because no attorney 
general, regardless of his or her opinion of the public interest in 
this matter, could bring a suit to remedy this conduct under the 
CFA.  That result seems unsupportable in Minnesota law, unless Ly 
is read to impose new restrictions on the powers of the attorney 
general not suggested in any prior case law and not apparent in the 
express statutory powers of the office. 
The cases decided thus far under the public benefit limit do 
not fit comfortably within these legal underpinnings of Ly.  In 
Dickson, for example, the consumers were told that they were 
buying a “promotional” boat used solely by the dealer when, in fact, 
the boat had been previously sold and registered in North Carolina 
and returned to the dealer because the prior owner was dissatisfied 
with the boat.252  The plaintiffs alleged that the representation was 
made in a brochure that was given to them at a boat show.253  But 
the court disagreed and found no public benefit present in 
Dickson.254  The exact same conduct occurred, in part, in an action 
brought by the attorney general against a Minnesota boat dealer.255  
 
 252. Dickson v. Lundquist, No. A04-990, 2005 WL 147719, at *1 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Jan. 25, 2005).  See supra Part IV.A.1.a. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at *2. 
 255. Compare Dickson, 2005 WL 147719, at *1, with State v. W. W. Holes Mfg. 
Co., No. C6-97-1018 (Sherburne Cty. Dist. Ct. July 3, 1997) (used boat motors sold 
42
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss1/3
4. COX - RC - REFORMAT 1.DOC 12/15/2006  1:27:43 PM 
2006] GOLIATH HAS THE SLINGSHOT 205 
And there is little doubt that the attorney general would have 
authority to proceed against a boat seller distributing a misleading 
brochure in such circumstances. 
The case of Zutz v. Case Corp., 256 and similar decisions, raise the 
problem of how requiring a showing of public benefit in the relief 
sought by the plaintiffs fits within the rationale that the private 
right of action is derivative of the attorney general’s authority.  
While this restriction arguably is consistent with the overall notion 
of public benefit enunciated in Ly, it is even further removed from 
the language and purpose of the private attorney general statute.  
Subdivision 3a of section 8.31 provides a right to recover damages 
for a CFA violation but makes no express mention of an injunction 
to stop future conduct, instead referring generally at the end of a 
sentence to “other equitable relief as determined by the court.”257  
This focus on damages contrasts with the attorney general’s 
authority in subdivision 3 of section 8.31, which is entitled 
“Injunctive relief” and expressly provides injunctive authority and 
the right to obtain substantial civil penalties, and the reference to 
attorney general injunctive authority in the CFA itself.258  It is not 
easy to reconcile the legislature’s creation of a private right of 
action containing more limited statutory remedies with a court-
imposed requirement that private litigants seek remedies 
equivalent to those that would be obtained by the attorney general 
in prosecuting a CFA claim. 
C. Fact Development of Public Benefit Limit 
The public benefit limit pushes litigants to fully develop the 
record on public dissemination of the sales representation at the 
beginning of the litigation or face dismissal of the claim.  This 
creates incentives for attorneys for plaintiffs to either reject 
representation or turn cases of individual loss into a class action or 
 
as demonstrators). 
 256. No. Civ.02-1776, 2003 WL 22848943 (D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2003).  See supra 
Part IV.A.1.a. 
 257. MINN. STAT. § 8.31, subdiv. 3a (2004). 
 258. Id. § 8.31, subdiv. 3.  There also is express statutory injunctive authority 
for an injunction by the attorney general in the CFA itself.  Id. § 325F.70, subdiv. 1.  
The FSAA also provides that county attorneys can bring criminal actions for a 
violation.  Id. § 325F.67.  The private attorney general statute further recognizes 
the broader scope of attorney general relief in section 8.31 by providing that “[i]n 
any action brought by the attorney general pursuant to this section, the court may 
award any of the remedies allowable under this subdivision.”  Id. § 8.31, subdiv. 3a. 
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something similar in terms of discovery and proof. 
Minnesota courts have a liberal standard for allowing litigants 
to obtain discovery prior to responding to a dispositive motion.259  
Facts relevant to a determination of public benefit as defined in Ly 
and its progeny could include the sort of sweeping discovery 
requests characteristic of an attorney general investigation.  A 
plaintiff reasonably could inquire about defendant’s advertising 
and public statements, lists of all other customers who may have 
received similar representations or been subject to similar 
omissions or made complaints to the defendant, training materials 
for salespeople who may have been told to routinely solicit 
customers in a similar manner, company operation or sales 
policies, and a multitude of other information that would bear on 
the defendant’s repetition of its conduct with other consumers.  
This sort of discovery increases litigation costs for all parties and 
often imposes burdens on the court to resolve related discovery 
disputes. 
Conversely, restricting plaintiffs from obtaining this sort of 
information in opposition to a motion on the merits of the public 
benefit limit would make it impossible for the vast majority of 
potential plaintiffs to ever bring an action as an individual under 
the private attorney general statute.  Individual consumers often 
have no way of knowing the nature or extent of a defendant’s 
conduct with other consumers.  As a practical matter, an individual 
subject to a deceptive practice often will be unlikely to know others 
who purchased the same merchandise and experienced the same 
sales practice.260  Restricting access to such discovery would place 
individual consumers with CFA claims in the situation of having to 
allege facts beyond their own experience with the defendant while 
being denied the right to discover facts in the defendant’s 
knowledge necessary to sustain the plaintiff’s claim. 
The need for discovery by private plaintiffs regarding the 
defendant’s broader business practices points out a relevant 
difference between attorney general cases and private CFA actions.  
The attorney general is given broad pre-complaint investigative 
authority in the form of a civil investigative demand.261  A private 
 
 259. See, e.g., Bixler by Bixler v. J.C. Penney Co., 376 N.W.2d 209, 217 (Minn. 
1985) (citing MINN. R. CIV. P. 56.06). 
 260. An exception is a false advertising case, but most consumer fraud cases 
are not about broadcast or widely distributed advertising.  See, e.g., supra note 171. 
 261. MINN. STAT. § 8.31, subdiv. 2 (2004).  See, e.g., Kohn v. State by Humphrey, 
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plaintiff lacks a similar mechanism.  This asymmetry in the 
authority of public and private actors seems to further undercut the 
rationale in Ly that the legislature tacitly intended to treat the 
private attorney general statute as co-extensive with the attorney 
general authority to enforce the CFA.  It seems unpersuasive that 
the legislature would use broad language in describing the private 
right of action (“any person injured . . . may bring a civil action”), 
but intend without expressly so stating to limit that right to cases of 
general public impact, while providing the attorney general—but 
not private plaintiffs—with authority to uncover patterns of 
conduct prior to suit. 
Justice Gilbert’s dissent in Ly hints at yet another problem with 
pretrial discovery and the public benefit limit, arguing that the 
court should have remanded the case to the trial court for a 
determination of facts relevant to the finding of a public benefit.262  
The court’s decision to reverse and enter judgment for Ms. 
Nystrom presaged the sweeping application of the public benefit 
limit as a matter of law in later lower court decisions.  In Collins, the 
court held again that the determination of a public benefit should 
be reviewed de novo.263  Treating the public benefit as a legal 
question exacerbates these discovery concerns.  Allowing lower 
courts to find no public benefit even when the facts are disputed 
obviously favors dismissal of such cases because of the asymmetry of 
information between individual consumers who may only know of 
their own transaction and defendants who obviously are aware of 
the company’s pattern of conduct. 
D. Uncertain Reach of the Public Benefit Limit Across Consumer Laws 
Finally, Ly raises concerns regarding its reach beyond the CFA 
to an entire range of other consumer protection laws and 
commercial regulations whose express private enforcement 
authority is predicated, in whole or in part, on the private attorney 
 
336 N.W.2d 292 (Minn. 1983). 
 262. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 315 (Minn. 2000) (Gilbert, J., dissenting 
in part). 
 263. Collins v. Minn. Sch. of Bus., Inc., 655 N.W.2d 320, 329 (Minn. 2003) 
(citing Hibbing Educ. Ass’n v. Pub. Employment Relations Bldg., 369 N.W.2d 527, 
529 (Minn. 1985)).  See also Heaven & Earth, Inc. v. Wyman Props. Ltd. P’ship, No. 
Civ. 03-3327, 2003 WL 22680935, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2003).  But see Laysar, 
Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. Civ. 04-4584, 2005 WL 2063929, at *3 
(D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2005). 
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general statute.264  The Ly court reached its result with no mention 
of this broader use of the private attorney general statute in 
Minnesota law. 
Minnesota courts applying laws other than the CFA which are 
also enforced under the private attorney general statute have 
applied the public benefit limit to determine prerequisite to suit.265  
Laws other than statutory fraud laws, however, rest uneasily under a 
public benefit limit.  Topical consumer laws, in particular, provide 
specific rights gauged to protect individuals from specific practices 
in certain types of marketplace transactions that the legislature has 
deemed problematic for consumers.  Applying the public benefit 
limit would mean that the legislature meant to exclude violations of 
such laws in one-on-one transactions while providing specific rights 
for the individuals engaged in this type of transaction. 
For instance, sellers of membership travel clubs that cost $500 
or more must provide detailed oral and written disclosures prior to 
purchase by the consumer, including the length of time the travel 
club has been operating and the number or percentage of 
consumers purchasing the service who have complained or 
cancelled their contracts pursuant to the right to cancel under the 
 
 264. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 314.  This contrasts with other states in which the 
judiciary has imposed, through case law, limits on the right of private plaintiffs to 
bring statutory fraud claims.  These states have looked only to the state UDAP 
statute.  See, e.g., cases cited supra note 171.  See also supra Part V.B.2. 
 265. Yarian v. Rainbow Foods Group, No. 01-1144, 2003 WL 24027721, at *7–8 
(D. Minn. Mar. 18, 2003) (regarding conduct of state employees under Minnesota 
Statutes section 43A.38); Burtch v. Oakland Park, Inc., Nos. A05-1585, A05-1589, 
A05-1587, A05-1588, 2006 WL 1806196 (Minn. Ct. App. July 3, 2006) (regulating 
conduct of manufactured home park lot rentals); Cavanaugh v. Hometown Am., 
L.L.C., No. A05-595, 2006 WL 696259, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2006) 
(claiming action for regulation of conduct by manufacturing home parks under 
Minnesota Statutes chapter 327C), rev. denied (Minn. May 24, 2006); All Parks 
Alliance for Change v. Uniprop Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. Income Fund, No. 
A05-912, 2006 WL 618932, at *3–4 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2006) (same), rev. 
granted (Minn. May 24, 2006); Schaff v. Chateau Cmtys., Inc., No. A04-1246, 2005 
WL 1734031, at *3–4 (Minn. Ct. App. July 26, 2005) (same), rev. denied (Minn. 
Sept. 28, 2005); Toth v. Arason, No. A04-769, 2005 WL 1216301, at *7 (Minn. Ct. 
App. May 17, 2005) (involving Truth in Repairs Act, Minnesota Statutes sections 
325F.56–.66), rev. granted (Minn. July 19, 2005); Timeline, L.L.C. v. Williams 
Holdings # 3, L.L.C., 698 N.W.2d 181, 189 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (applying 
mortgage originator statute, Minnesota Statutes section 58.13 (2002)), rev. denied 
(Minn. Aug. 24, 2005); Jensen v. Duluth Area YMCA, 688 N.W.2d 574, 578 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2004) (involving Non-profit Corporation Act, Minnesota Statutes chapter 
317A).  See also Davis v. U.S. Bancorp, 383 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 2004) (analyzing 
Minnesota Statutes section 58.13 claims as well as statutory fraud claims under the 
private attorney general statute). 
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law.266  Under section 325G.51, violations of these requirements are 
“subject to the penalties and remedies provided in section 8.31.”267  
The use of the public benefit limit to exclude a lawsuit under the 
private attorney general statute by an individual consumer who did 
not receive the proper oral disclosures in a “one-on-one” purchase 
of a high cost travel club would be hard to reconcile with the 
granting of such consumer-specific rights under section 325G.505.  
It is difficult to discern a rationale for holding that the legislature 
created such transaction-specific rights, but meant to provide no 
private right of action for an individual subjected to a violation of 
the law in just such a transaction.  Conversely, nothing in the 
express language of the enforcement provision for this law, section 
325G.51, obviously distinguishes the incorporation of the private 
attorney general statute in this context from its incorporation as 
the remedial provision for the CFA. 
The public benefit limit would also likely have led to a 
different result in a prior decision of the Minnesota Supreme 
Court, Jacobs v. Rosemount Dodge-Winnebago South. 268  The plaintiffs in 
Jacobs were a couple who purchased a mobile home in a one-on-one 
transaction.269  They prevailed at trial, including their claim for 
breach of express warranty.270  The court held that because 
breaches of an express warranty constitute per se violations of the 
consumer protection act, attorney’s fees were recoverable.271  
However, the holding that the plaintiffs engaged in a one-on-one 
transaction had a right to recover attorney’s fees under the private 
attorney general statute would not be sustainable under the public 
benefit limit. 
Requiring the plaintiff to prove “public benefit” in a private 
right of action under these topical laws would invite a restriction of 
consumer protection enforcement across a range of statutes—a 
restriction for which there is no support in the language or 
purpose of those statutes.  In short, Ly is an unwarranted invitation 
for courts to rewrite Minnesota law in favor of specific businesses 
whose conduct as to individual consumers the legislature sought to 
 
 266. MINN. STAT. § 325G.505 (2004). 
 267. Id. § 325G.51. 
 268. 310 N.W.2d 71, 79–80 (Minn. 1981). 
 269. Id. at 73. 
 270. Id. at 79. 
 271. Id.  After Jacobs was decided, the relevant laws were re-codified to state 
that violation of an express warranty constitutes a CFA violation.  See MINN. STAT. § 
325G.20 (2004). 
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restrain in passing topical consumer protection laws. 
VII.   THE PUBLIC BENEFIT LIMIT UNDERCUTS PROGRESSIVE 
CONSUMER ENFORCEMENT 
The public benefit limit has reduced the progressiveness of 
Minnesota consumer protection law.  The doctrine was created by 
the judiciary and should be either overturned or substantially 
narrowed, or it should be eliminated by legislative action, as has 
occurred in Illinois and Connecticut. 
A. The Public Benefit Limit Has Reduced Access to the Courts in Cases of 
Marketplace Deception and Unequal Bargaining Power 
If progressive private enforcement of Minnesota statutory 
fraud laws means that consumers can use these laws to obtain relief 
from transactions entered in circumstances of unequal marketplace 
bargaining power, then the public benefit limit has impaired the 
progressiveness of Minnesota consumer protection laws.  It has 
done so because it excludes consumer protection claims that 
involve substantial bargaining power disparities, in many instances 
greater disparities than are present in claims allowed under the 
rule.  The public benefit limit also reduces progressive 
enforcement by creating uncertainty and realigning incentives for 
attorneys considering representing clients with claims of 
marketplace deception and fraud. 
1. The Public Benefit Limit Precludes Suits by Consumers with 
Unequal Bargaining Power 
One need look no further than the outcome of cases under 
the public benefit limit to determine that it has served to unequally 
distribute access to the courts so that more powerful parties will 
sometimes be able to assert consumer protection claims while those 
at a marketplace disadvantage have no right to bring a claim.  
Individual consumers faced with significant bargaining power 
disparities have been denied access to the courts while marketplace 
competitors have had more success crossing the public benefit 
threshold.  In the example cases noted above, a consumer buying a 
boat from a dealer, a homeowner seeking a mortgage refinance 
from a major financial institution and a family farmer deceived 
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about the qualities of equipment obtained from a large equipment 
manufacturer were unable to bring CFA claims.272  Business 
plaintiffs, on the other hand, have fared somewhat better in 
asserting statutory fraud claims.273 
Hoang Minh Ly’s case was a stark example of an individual in 
an unequal bargaining position.  He had little formal education, 
had little command of the English language, and appeared to have 
been manipulated by a more sophisticated seller who repeatedly 
told him to trust her and not to consult a lawyer.274  The fraud 
perpetrated against him was found by the court to involve 
“reprehensible conduct.”275  Yet, he had no private right to enforce 
consumer protection laws.276  Contrast Laysar, Inc. v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,277 in which an auto glass repair 
company and allied plaintiffs sought to force an insurer to pay its 
claims in full and argued that the insurer violated the CFA by 
selling auto policies that falsely implied full glass coverage while 
“short paying virtually every glass shop invoice.”278  While the suit by 
the individual plaintiff in this case may be of benefit to consumers 
generally, the case primarily involves a dispute between businesses.  
There is little doubt that Mr. Ly suffered from a larger bargaining 
disparity than did Laysar, Inc.  Similarly, while the CFA suit by 
Thomas & Betts Corporation279 may have been of some benefit to 
users of waste oil furnaces, allowing it to pursue a claim against a 
former distributor clearly does less to remedy unequal bargaining 
power than allowing the Dicksons280 to recover on a CFA claim for a 
boat previously sold to a buyer in another state, returned due to 
poor quality, and resold as a demonstrator to the plaintiffs. 
The bias in the public benefit limit in favor of class actions 
over individual suits also does not necessarily serve the purpose of 
remedying unequal bargaining power.  There is no reason to doubt 
the allowance of CFA suits by investors in junior mortgage notes or 
 
 272. See supra Part IV.A.1.a. 
 273. See supra notes 159–161, 171, and accompanying text. 
 274. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 305–06 (Minn. 2000). 
 275. Id. at 314. 
 276. Id. 
 277. No. Civ. 04-4584, 2005 WL 2063929 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2005). 
 278. Id. at *1. 
 279. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Leger, No. A04-260, 2004 WL 2711391 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 26, 2005). 
 280. Dickson v. Lundquist, No. A04-990, 2005 WL 147719 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 
25, 2005). 
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purchasers of ink cartridges with computer printers.281  Such class 
action suits, however, do not necessarily do more to advance the 
purpose of providing consumers a remedy for unequal bargaining 
power than the case brought by Virginia Scally,282 who went to Wells 
Fargo Mortgage “to refinance her home and consolidate her credit-
card debt with an existing home-equity loan.”283 
These results are likely to persist because of the bias in the 
construction of the “public benefit” limit in favor of certain types of 
litigants.  Individual consumers typically are sold goods through 
oral communication or a pattern of conduct with salespeople when 
purchasing a car, boat, appliance, loan, or other merchandise.  
These transactions have an inherent tendency to be “one-on-one” 
in nature.  Business litigants, however, will often bring suit to 
change the general practices or public solicitations of their 
competitors or others.  Despite Collins,284 false advertising suits 
usually are brought by business competitors, not consumers.285  But 
it is false advertising suits, or similar claims, that will have the 
easiest time meeting the public benefit limit, because these actions 
involve broad dissemination of the offending representations to the 
public.  This outcome favors suit by competitive equals while 
reducing access to suit by those on the lesser end of a disparity in 
bargaining power. 
This is not a zero sum situation, in any case.  CFA claims by 
individuals could be allowed to proceed while other types of 
plaintiffs also have access to the courts.  But it is especially 
regressive to allow larger, better-funded litigants the right to pursue 
CFA claims while denying that right to individuals with typically 
smaller claims. 
It is difficult to reconcile these outcomes with the court’s 
repeated statements that statutory fraud laws are meant to “address 
the unequal bargaining power that is often found in consumer 
transactions.”286  The Ly decision and later cases make no mention 
 
 281. Meyer v. Dygert, 156 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (D. Minn. 2001); Johnson v. 
Hewlett-Packard Co., No. CX-01-1641, 2002 WL 1050426 (Minn. Ct. App. May 22, 
2002). 
 282. Scally v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., No. C4-02-2181, 2003 WL 22039526 
(Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2003). 
 283. Id. at *1. 
 284. Collins v. Minn. Sch. of Bus., Inc., 655 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 2003). 
 285. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 171. 
 286. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 308 (Minn. 2000).  See cases cited supra 
note 45. 
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of how the purpose of remedying unequal bargaining power can be 
reconciled with holding that individual consumers subject to 
deception by more sophisticated parties have no right to enforce 
these laws.287  The strict dichotomy in Ly between an expansively 
read CFA and a constricted private attorney general statute is also 
hard to reconcile with the court’s oft-articulated position, 
reiterated in the Ly decision, that statutory fraud laws are meant to 
encourage aggressive prosecutions.288  If these laws have nothing to 
say about who has a remedy for a violation, then they cannot 
meaningfully encourage aggressive prosecutions.  The public 
benefit limit, in fact, has had the exact opposite effect—to 
eliminate suits by entire categories of plaintiffs with otherwise valid 
statutory fraud claims. 
2. The Public Benefit Limit Reduces Progressiveness by Increasing 
Uncertainty and Changing Incentives for Plaintiff’s Counsel 
The public benefit limit can chill suits for reasons beyond the 
litany of poor outcomes for plaintiffs.  Eliminating statutory fraud 
claims for individuals does not mean that these plaintiffs necessarily 
lack a legal basis for relief, even if common law fraud is the only 
claim.289  It does mean that these plaintiffs are unlikely to obtain an 
award of attorney’s fees, which for all practical purposes means 
 
 287. Brasel concluded that the majority rejected any consideration of unequal 
bargaining power in determining what is a public benefit:  
Both the Ly majority and the Watpro dissent can be read to suggest that 
an analysis of the sophistication of the parties is not relevant to a public 
benefit. Nothing about the bargaining power of the parties to a private 
lawsuit speaks to the issue of whether the consumers of Minnesota are 
benefited by a particular plaintiff’s action.  Thus, an unsophisticated 
consumer with little bargaining power should not be allowed to make use 
of the Private AG Statute unless the transaction he or she complains of 
reaches a wider audience.   
Brasel, supra note 237, at 340. 
 288. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 308. 
 289. There are some cases where the plaintiff may not have another claim 
because statutory fraud laws broaden the cause of action for fraud and deception 
by eliminating elements of common law fraud.  For example, in Wiegand v. Walser 
Automotive Groups, Inc., 683 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. 2004), the plaintiff alleged an oral 
misrepresentation contradicted by a later, written representation in the contract.  
The plaintiff had no common law fraud claim because the contract clause 
contradicting the oral representation provided a defense as a matter of law on the 
justifiable reliance element of common law fraud.  Id. at 810.  Under the CFA, 
common law justifiable reliance is not an element of the claim and thus the lower 
courts dismissal of the case was reversed.  Id. at 812–13. 
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there is no right to relief for many or most of these plaintiffs.  
Denying the right to recover attorney’s fees actively, perhaps fatally, 
discourages most private prosecutions of fraud violations.  As the 
court’s majority observed in Church of Nativity, failure to grant 
attorney’s fees in that case would mean that “Nativity will spend 
virtually all of its damage award paying its attorneys.”290  The 
encouragement of suit by private counsel also was the point 
emphasized in the court of appeals decisions cited in Ly.291 
The public benefit limit on suit introduces substantial 
uncertainty into the calculus for attorneys considering 
representation of plaintiffs with possible statutory fraud claims.  As 
the court of appeals stated in Dickson, the notion of “public benefit” 
can mean “about what you want it to be.”292  The uncertainty of the 
parameters of the doctrine makes it difficult for a potential 
plaintiff’s counsel to estimate the likelihood of prevailing before 
the court, which makes it less likely for such counsel to accept 
representation of consumers with fraud claims.  In Collins, for 
instance, the trial court “denied any attorney fees on the ground 
that [plaintiffs’] claims” lacked public benefit, despite the fact that 
there were eighteen plaintiffs making similar complaints about 
representations that were, in part, in broadcast advertising and 
written materials.293 
The alternate rationale used by courts for the exclusion of 
statutory fraud claims under the public benefit limit also is 
troubling from the perspective of certainty of outcomes in private 
enforcement of these laws.  Several courts have dismissed statutory 
fraud claims because the defendant ceased the conduct or the 
plaintiff’s requested relief was deemed insufficiently publicly 
minded to allow a statutory fraud claim to proceed.294  This means 
that a potential plaintiff’s attorney faces the additional uncertainty 
that later actions of the defendant, or of a public agency, can 
deprive the plaintiff of a possible statutory fraud claim. 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys can increase the likelihood of prevailing 
under the public benefit limit by putting additional resources into 
 
 290. Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. WatPro, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 1, 8 
(Minn. 1992). 
 291. See supra Part V.B.1. 
 292. Dickson v. Lundquist, No. A04-990, 2005 WL 147719, at *2 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Jan. 25, 2005). 
 293. Collins v. Minn. Sch. of Bus., Inc., 655 N.W.2d 320, 322 (Minn. 2003). 
 294. See supra notes 188–191 and accompanying text. 
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pre-complaint investigations or by filing an action and pursuing 
discovery for the purpose of better establishing that the 
defendant’s conduct reached other consumers.295  Plaintiff 
attorneys thus have an incentive to either refuse to represent 
individuals with consumer protection problems, or to attempt to 
turn such cases into a class action or a case with multiple, joined 
plaintiffs.  Pursuing this sort of mass action increases the costs and 
risks of such litigation.  And larger cases do not necessarily mean 
more remedies for unequal bargaining power in the marketplace, 
especially if it precludes the willingness of attorneys to help 
individuals with smaller claims. 
Uncertainties and other disincentives for attorneys to take 
cases for individuals are less of a concern for business plaintiffs 
pursuing violations of statutory fraud laws.  Companies presumably 
have business motivations for engaging in litigation, and resources 
for conducting the litigation, that make attorney’s fees under 
statutory fraud laws a bonus rather than an essential factor in 
deciding to pursue a case.  The businesses pursuing Lanham Act 
claims against competitor advertising, for example, likely would 
bring the case in the absence of a valid state statutory fraud claim. 
B. The Public Benefit Limit Should Be Abandoned or Narrowly Focused 
Even if a more progressive interpretation of the law is not 
considered a desirable goal consistent with the enunciated purpose 
of statutory fraud laws, the Minnesota Supreme Court should 
abandon the public benefit limit on the private attorney general 
statute.  This doctrine ignores the unambiguous language of the 
statute; it is uneasily and improperly grounded in the attorney 
general’s discretionary authority; it violates the oft-stated purposes 
of statutory fraud laws; and it creates uncertainty in enforcing a 
range of topical consumer protection laws.  Perhaps most 
importantly, the public benefit limit is not a discerning or effective 
means to address the problem underlying its creation.  This last 
point is the focus of the remainder of this Article. 
1. The Poor Fit Between the Court’s Concerns and the Public Benefit 
Limit 
The majority in Ly seemed animated by a concern with putting 
 
 295. See supra Part VI.C. 
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limits on the broadly worded and construed CFA so that it would 
not become an additional, routine claim in common disputes 
between litigants in order to obtain attorney’s fees.296  The court 
cited Justice Simonett’s dissent in Church of Nativity expressing the 
fear that “enterprising plaintiffs” might seek attorney’s fees in cases 
beyond those intended under the private attorney general 
statute.297  The court also worried that “artful counsel could dress 
up his dog bite case” to obtain fees under the statute.298 
The public benefit limit appears aimed at striking a balance 
between maintaining a broad reading of statutory fraud laws and 
this articulated concern with use of these laws to obtain attorney’s 
fees in routine cases.  Although it is sometimes lost in the roll-back 
of the right to bring a private enforcement action, the court in Ly 
unanimously found that the transaction between a restaurant buyer 
and seller was within the scope of the CFA.299  Two subsequent 
decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court have emphasized that 
statutory fraud laws are broader than common law fraud.300  In 
Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., the court answered 
certified questions from the federal district court and held that 
non-purchasers can bring a CFA claim and that proof of individual 
common law reliance is not required to bring a CFA claim.301  In 
Wiegand v. Walser Automotive Groups, Inc., the court reversed the 
lower courts, reiterating that the CFA eliminated the common law 
requirement of reliance and holding that deceptive oral statements 
contradicted by written statements are actionable under the CFA.302 
These cases support broadly applying the CFA, and encourage 
relaxed standards for proof of injury under the private attorney 
 
 296. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 314 (Minn. 2000).  But see Sovern, supra 
note 9, at 446–48 (suggesting that merchants should bear the burden of proving a 
proposed defense and if successful, should bear no liability for attorney’s fees). 
 297. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 311 (citing Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. 
WatPro, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 1992) (Simonett, J., dissenting in part)). 
 298. Id. at 312 (citing Liess v. Lindemyer, 354 N.W.2d 556, 558 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1984)). 
 299. Id. at 310. 
 300. See Wiegand v. Walser Auto. Groups, Inc., 683 N.W.2d 807, 812 (Minn. 
2004); Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., 621 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 2001).  
At least one commentator also has suggested that Minnesota has broad, pro-
consumer statutory fraud laws.  See Marshall H. Tanick, Fool’s Paradise: Expansion of 
the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Laws, 58 BENCH & B. MINN. 37 (May/June, 2001) 
(arguing that the holding in Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc. in 
particular made Minnesota consumer protection statutes “more user friendly”). 
 301. 621 N.W.2d at 12. 
 302. 683 N.W.2d at 812. 
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general statute, but they leave in place the stringent restriction 
imposed by the adoption of the public benefit limit in Ly.  On 
remand in Wiegand, the court of appeals recently affirmed the trial 
court’s dismissal of the case for failure to meet the public benefit 
limit.303  The net result is that Minnesota, at least as articulated by 
the Minnesota Supreme Court, has broad statutory fraud laws for 
mass actions (public enforcement, class actions, or joined cases 
involving multiple plaintiffs), but a strong presumption against 
individual or smaller claims under those laws.304 
 
 303. Wiegand v. Walser Auto. Groups, Inc., No. A05-1911, 2006 WL 1529511 
(Minn. Ct. App. June 6, 2006). 
 304. The sixteen cases allowed to proceed or which affirmed judgment for the 
plaintiff without reference to the public benefit limit are cited supra notes 170–
172.  The forty-nine dismissals of statutory fraud claims without reference by the 
court to the public benefit limit for the same period, broken down by type of 
plaintiff, are as follows: Class or putative class plaintiffs: Parkhill v. Minn. Mut. Life 
Ins. Co., 286 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2002); Twite v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., No. 05-
2210, 2006 WL 839504 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2006); Thinesen v. JBC Legal Group, 
P.C., No. 05-518, 2005 WL 2346991 (D. Minn. Sept. 26, 2005); Gardner v. First Am. 
Title Ins. Co., 296 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (D. Minn. 2003); Denelsbeck v. Wells Fargo & 
Co., 666 N.W.2d 339 (Minn. 2003); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Majors, No. A04-
1468, 2005 WL 1021551 (Minn. Ct. App. May 3, 2005); Porch v. Gen. Motors 
Acceptance Corp., 642 N.W.2d 473 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); Carey v. Select Comfort 
Corp., No. 27CV 04-015451, 2006 WL 871619 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 30, 2006); Dahl 
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. MP 03-5582, 2005 WL 1172019 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 
May 11, 2005); Mitchell v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., No. CT 02-17299, 2004 WL 
2137815 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 13, 2004); Business or organizational plaintiffs: 
Popp Telecom, Inc. v. Am. Sharecom, Inc., 361 F.3d 482 (8th Cir. 2004); Rainbow 
Play Sys., Inc. v. GroundScape Tech., L.L.C., 364 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (D. Minn. 
2005); Masterson Personnel, Inc. v. McClatchy Co., No. Civ. 05-1274, 2005 WL 
3132349 (D. Minn. Nov. 22, 2005); Lutheran Ass'n of Missionaries & Pilots, Inc. v. 
Lutheran Ass'n of Missionaries & Pilots, Inc., No. Civ. 03-6173, 2004 WL 1212083 
(D. Minn. May 20, 2004); Solvay Pharms., Inc. v. Global Pharms., 298 F. Supp. 2d 
880 (D. Minn. 2004); SICK, Inc. v. Motion Control Corp., No. Civ. 01-1496, 2003 
WL 21448864 (D. Minn. June 19, 2003); Stephenson v. Deutsche Bank AG, 282 F. 
Supp. 2d 1032 (D. Minn. 2003); Taylor Inv. Corp. v. Weil, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1046 
(D. Minn. 2001); First Nat’l Bank of North v. Miller Schroeder Fin., Inc., 709 
N.W.2d 295 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 2006); NJR of 
Woodbury, Inc. v. Woida, No. A05-268, 2005 WL 3372625 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 
2005); Loop Corp. v. McIlroy, No. A04-362, 2004 WL 2221619 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Oct. 5, 2004); Lyon Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Protech Plumbing & Heating, Inc., No. A03-
810, 2004 WL 376966 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2004); Arrowhead Bluffs, Inc. v. 
Blackburn, Nos. C8-03-301, A03-755, 2003 WL 22778336 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 
2003); and Individual plaintiffs: Bykov v. Radisson Hotels Int’l, Inc., No. Civ.05-
1280, 2006 WL 752942 (D. Minn. Mar. 22, 2006); Hecksel v. Cent. Livestock Ass'n, 
Inc., No. Civ. 03-2604, 2005 WL 2406032 (D. Minn. Sept. 29, 2005); Foster v. St. 
Jude Med., Inc., 229 F.R.D. 599 (D. Minn. 2005); Hopkins v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 
No. 03-5433, 2004 WL 1854191 (D. Minn. Aug. 19, 2004); Reno v. Supportkids, 
Inc., No. Civ.01-2331, 2004 WL 828150 (D. Minn. Apr. 13, 2004); Golden v. Town 
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The public benefit limit is both ineffective and unfair as a 
means of balancing broad application of statutory fraud laws and 
the perceived potential for misuse of those laws to shift attorney’s 
fees in routine cases.  Eliminating individual claims is not a 
substitute for finding a balance.  Claims arising from individual 
“one-on-one” transactions are not universally attempts to dress up 
dog bite cases; and the class action, joinder, and business-plaintiff 
suits allowed since Ly are not always a close fit with the “intended 
scope” of the private attorney general statute.  The Ly court never 
explained how restricting suits arising from one-on-one 
transactions resolved the perceived problem of overuse of statutory 
fraud laws to shift attorney’s fees in routine cases.  The public 
 
& Country Credit, No. Civ.02-3627, 2004 WL 229078 (D. Minn. Feb. 3, 2004); 
Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning L.L.C., No. Civ.02-791, 2003 WL 21909570 (D. 
Minn. July 28, 2003), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 386 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2004); 
Keckhafer v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. Civ.01-1017, 2002 WL 31185866 (D. 
Minn. Oct. 1, 2002); Michel v. Vogelpohl, No. A05-1263, 2006 WL 1073191 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2006); Liabo v. Wayzata Nissan, L.L.C., 707 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2006); Pugh v. Westreich, No. A04-657, 
2005 WL 14922 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2005), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 29, 2005); 
Reinke v. Harold Chevrolet-Geo, Inc., No. A03-1148, 2004 WL 1152700 (Minn. Ct. 
App. May 20, 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 17, 2004); Redden v. Minneapolis 
Cmty. & Technical Coll., No. A03-1202, 2004 WL 835768 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 
2004); Higgins v. Harold Chevrolet-Geo, Inc., No. A04-596, 2004 WL 2660923 
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2004); Shafer v. GSF Mortgage Corp., No. C1-02-1165, 
2003 WL 21005793 (Minn. Ct. App. May 6, 2003); Beutz v. Marshall, No. C5-02-
1489, 2003 WL 1816024 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2003); Tisdell v. ValAdCo, Nos. 
C6-01-2057, C0-01-2054, C6-01-2060, C2-01-2005, 2002 WL 31368336 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Oct. 16, 2002); Erickson v. Horing, No. C4-02-138, 2002 WL 31163611 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2002) (three individual joined plaintiffs); Swanson v. Minn. FAIR 
Plan, No. CX-01-1994, 2002 WL 859859 (Minn. Ct. App. May 7, 2002); Sather v. 
State Farm Fire Cas. Ins. Co., No. C3-01-1268, 2002 WL 378111 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Mar. 12, 2002); Nagle v. N. Cent. Life Ins. Co., No. C4-01-663, 2002 WL 15689 
(Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2002); Lofquist v. Whitaker Buick-Jeep-Eagle, Inc., No. C5-
01-767, 2001 WL 1530907 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2001); Swarthout v. Mut. Serv. 
Life Ins. Co., 632 N.W.2d 741 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Flynn v. Am. Home Prods. 
Corp., 627 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Rothenberg v. Milne, No. C6-00-
444, 2000 WL 1780326 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2000); Gagne v. Septon, No. CT 02-
001508, 2004 WL 3090375 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 30, 2004); Sachs v. Minneapolis 
Cmty. & Technical Coll., No. CT 02-7231, 2003 WL 23893283 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 
4, 2003).  Thus, of cases decided after Ly but prior to July 31, 2006 that did not 
expressly apply the public benefit limit, forty-nine of sixty-five (seventy-five 
percent) were dismissed.   This result provides reasons to doubt the validity of the 
Ly majority’s concern with overuse of statutory fraud laws. The most common 
reasons for dismissal were: the plaintiffs’ claim was not within the scope of the 
CFA; the plaintiffs failed to show a disputed material fact as to deception; or the 
plaintiffs failed to establish a causal nexus between the alleged deceptive conduct 
and the alleged injury. 
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benefit limit works to meet its goal only in the sense that 
eliminating all individual claims eliminates all perceived problems 
from a large share of cases raising statutory fraud claims. 
For instance, when class plaintiffs in a CFA suit alleged 
primarily breach of contract, the state district court in Edwards v. 
Long Beach rejected defendant Washington Mutual’s motion to 
dismiss.305  Each member of the class had been charged $60 for a 
payoff quote and then provided an inaccurate payoff statement.306  
In allowing the suit to proceed, the court noted the number of 
individuals affected by the practice and “oppressive nature of the 
practices.”307  In Ali v. Francois, the state district court allowed seven 
joined plaintiffs to bring CFA claims.308  The plaintiffs had entered 
contracts with the defendant corporation under which the 
plaintiffs made upfront payments to the defendant in exchange for 
work as “janitorial subcontractors” on jobs to be arranged by the 
defendant.309  The plaintiffs sued for breach of these contracts and 
violations of the CFA, among other claims.310  The court found a 
public benefit to the suit because of the potential for continued 
misconduct by the defendant, and entered judgment against the 
defendants.311 
Both of these cases involve more than one-on-one transactions 
and are within the type of CFA claim permissible under the public 
benefit limit.  In both of these cases, however, the underlying 
conduct of the defendant was held to be a breach of contract, and 
the CFA claim flowed from the implied representations in the 
contract.312  This contrasts with the false and deceptive non-
contractual oral representations made to Mr. Ly,313 and with the 
false and misleading claims of product quality or origin made to 
the Dicksons314 or the Zutz family315—all of which seem to fall more 
 
 305. Edwards v. Long Beach Mortgage Co., No. CT 02-16446, 2004 WL 
2137824, *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 22, 2004). 
 306. Id. at *2. 
 307. Id. at *4. 
 308. Ali v. Francois, No. CT 02-002459, 2003 WL 23515768, at *5 (Minn. Dist. 
Ct. Nov. 5, 2003). 
 309. Id. at *1. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. at *4. 
 312. Edwards, 2004 WL 2137824, at *4; Ali, 2003 WL 23515768, at *3. 
 313. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Minn. 2000). 
 314. Dickson v. Lundquist, No. A04-990, 2005 WL 147719, at *1 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Jan. 25, 2005). 
 315. Zutz v. Case Corp., No. Civ. 02-1776, 2003 WL 22848943, at *1 (D. Minn. 
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easily into the category of deception and fraud that is the focus of 
the CFA.  Yet all these latter cases were dismissed as lacking a 
public benefit. 
2. A Refocused Public Benefit Test 
If neither the court nor the legislature decides to eliminate the 
public benefit limit on private statutory fraud actions, the doctrine 
should at least be narrowed and refocused on the issue it was 
meant to resolve.  A revised public benefit doctrine could directly 
address the court’s concern with the use of the fee-shifting 
provision in the private attorney general statute by limiting the 
amount of attorney’s fee awards in cases involving conduct that is 
not related to the underlying purposes of the consumer protection 
laws. 
Minnesota courts consider several factors, such as time 
expended and experience of counsel, in determining the proper 
amount to award in attorney’s fees.316  A revised public benefit 
doctrine could add additional factors to that list in cases of 
attorney’s fee awards under the private attorney general statute.  
Specifically, such factors might include the following: (1) the 
centrality of the consumer protection claim to the conduct at issue 
in the case; (2) whether the attorney’s fee award will encourage 
other counsel to assume representation in similar consumer 
protection cases; (3) whether the damage award or other relief 
obtained by the plaintiff(s) remedies the conduct, or provides a 
disincentive to the defendant or similarly situated entities to 
engage in such conduct; and (4) whether the plaintiff’s suit is 
otherwise of benefit to the public. 
There are at least three important advantages to a narrowed 
and refocused public benefit test.  First, it would be directed at the 
problem articulated by the court, which is awarding of attorney’s 
fees to litigants whose cases will promote the purposes of 
Minnesota consumer protection laws.  The proposed test for 
attorney’s fees allows courts discretion to limit substantial fee-
shifting in cases of peripheral consumer protection concern.  Most 
“dog bite” cases will not survive judgment as a matter of law on the 
merits of the statutory fraud claim or the need to establish a causal 
nexus between consumer injury and the alleged fraud.  In the cases 
 
Nov. 21, 2003). 
 316. State v. Paulson, 290 Minn. 371, 373, 188 N.W.2d 424, 426 (1971). 
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that are held to properly allege a statutory fraud claim, but that 
appear remote from the purpose of those laws, courts can reduce 
attorney’s fees accordingly. 
Second, limiting the public benefit test to the amount of 
attorney’s fees awarded provides a more appropriate sliding scale 
for the courts to apply when compared to forcing dismissal of 
claims.  The current public benefit doctrine is a limit on private 
suits.  It acts like a meat cleaver, either separating the statutory 
fraud claims or allowing them to proceed.  If the plaintiff alleges 
only a one-on-one transaction, his or her statutory fraud claim 
likely will be dismissed.  A public benefit test tied to the amount of 
attorney’s fees allows courts flexibility in matching the degree of 
public benefit to the amount of fee-shifting. 
The decision to award attorney’s fees occurs only after 
judgment on the underlying statutory fraud claim.  Accordingly, 
the court will be aware of all the relevant facts and circumstances at 
the time it makes a determination of the public benefit in awarding 
fees.  Under the current public benefit limit, the court typically 
makes this determination on motion at the outset of the litigation, 
sometimes before any discovery has occurred.  Pushing back the 
time of applying the test also promotes judicial efficiency, as cases 
will often be settled or dismissed on other grounds before the court 
is forced to make a ruling on the amount of attorney’s fees. 
Third and finally, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the 
language of the private attorney general statute arguably provides 
some support for this approach.  The majority in Ly made no 
attempt to identify any ambiguity in the language of the private 
attorney general statute.  As the dissenters noted, there is no 
ambiguity in the phrase granting a private right of action to “any 
person injured by a violation” of the statutory fraud laws.317  Even 
accepting the court’s logical leap in limiting private suits to the 
attorney general’s authority, this is an uneasy and ill-fitting legal 
basis for the doctrine, for the reasons previously noted. 
Minnesota Statutes section 8.31 allows for the recovery of 
“reasonable attorney’s fees.”318  The term “reasonable” is sufficiently 
ambiguous to support a construction that allows for consideration 
of the purpose of the private attorney general statute and the 
 
 317. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 315 (Minn. 2000) (Page, J., dissenting in 
part). 
 318. MINN. STAT. § 8.31, subdiv. 3a (2004). 
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incorporated statutory fraud laws.  It also is consistent with the 
older Minnesota Court of Appeals decisions that held “public 
interest” should be a consideration in determining the amount of 
the attorney’s fee award. 319 
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
Minnesota courts have actively stretched beyond the express 
statutory language to create legal barriers effectively shutting the 
courthouse door to individual consumers with otherwise valid 
statutory fraud claims alleging marketplace deception.  The public 
benefit limit enunciated in Ly v. Nystrom tacitly overturned long-
standing case law with a vague and improperly grounded doctrine.  
It has been used by Minnesota courts to routinely dismiss claims by 
individuals under Minnesota statutory fraud laws, in effect limiting 
statutory fraud suits mostly to better-funded and more powerful 
litigants.  As a result, Minnesota cannot be said to have progressive 
law for private enforcement of consumer protection laws.  The 
court or the legislature should eliminate the public benefit limit, or 
at least narrow and refocus the doctrine on the perceived policy 
concern underlying its creation. 
 
 319. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 312 (citing Wexler v. Bros. Entm’t Group, Inc., 457 
N.W.2d 218, 222–23 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), Liess v. Lindemyer, 354 N.W.2d 556, 
558 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), and Untiedt v. Grand Labs., Inc., Nos. C4-94-772, C0-
94-851, 1994 WL 714308, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)). 
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